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INTRODUCTION
T HERE has been no shortage of efforts to justify the common
lawmaking powers of the federal courts. In the course of these
efforts, it is commonplace to underscore three features of the
common law that federal courts develop without congressional au-
thorization. First, this law "is truly federal law in the sense that it is
controlling in... actions in state courts as well as in federal
courts."' Second, to the extent that the federal courts proceed
without congressional authorization, federal common law is "spe-
cialized."2 It is confined, at least as a matter of doctrine, to several
well-recognized enclaves, such as interstate disputes, international
relations, admiralty, and proprietary transactions of the United
States.' Third, Congress can always abrogate it.
Despite the consistent emphasis on these characteristics of fed-
eral common law, a large body of federal common law exists that
does not embody them. This body of law can be characterized as
"procedural common law"-common law that is concerned primar-
ily with the regulation of internal court processes rather than sub-
' 19 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice
& Procedure § 4505 (2d ed. 1996).
2 Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 405 (1964).
3See, e.g., Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (listing en-
claves of federal common law).
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stantive rights and obligations. With few exceptions, this body of
law falls outside of the traditional definitions of federal common
law. Procedural common law does not generally bind state courts;4
though developed without congressional authorization, it falls out-
side of the traditionally recognized enclaves of federal common
law; and Congress's ability to abrogate it is often called into ques-
tion.' While the sources of and limits upon federal court power to
develop substantive common law have received serious and sus-
tained scholarly attention, the sources of and limits upon federal
court power to develop procedural common law have been almost
entirely overlooked.
This Article will offer an account of the federal common law of
procedure. Part I will introduce the problem. After giving a brief
account of the law and scholarship addressing the power of the
federal courts to develop substantive common law, it will draw at-
tention to the existence of procedural common law by describing
five representative doctrines: abstention, forum non conveniens,
stare decisis, remittitur, and preclusion. While each of these doc-
trines is a familiar piece of federal law, Part I will point out that the
courts developing these doctrines have not addressed the question
of their authority to do so.
Part II will address this question of authority. After concluding
that no statute generally authorizes the federal courts to develop a
common law of procedure, it will explore potential constitutional
justifications for that authority. It will first develop a theory that
tracks the conventional justification for federal common law to in-
clude procedure. Federal procedure, like the traditional enclaves
addressed by substantive federal common law, is a matter that the
constitutional structure places beyond the authority of the states.
Both the Inferior Tribunals Clause and the Sweeping Clause grant
Congress the authority to regulate the procedure of the federal
courts. If Congress fails to exercise its authority over procedure,
the federal courts can regulate procedure in common law fashion.
They can only do so, however, until Congress steps in. If Congress
4 See Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 39, 178-81 (observing that state courts need not
"mimic federal courts procedurally," even when they hear cases involving federal
law).
'See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
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chooses to legislate, conflicting federal procedural common law
must give way to federal statute.
This explanation has force, but it tells only part of the story. In
treating the procedural common lawmaking authority of the fed-
eral courts as derivative of and subservient to that of Congress, it
fails to account for the fact that power might be distributed differ-
ently between the courts and Congress on matters of procedure
than on matters of substance. In particular, it fails to account for
the possibility that federal court authority over procedure might
sometimes, even if rarely, exceed that of Congress.
Part II will then explore a theory that would account for that
possibility: the proposition that Article III empowers federal courts
to adopt procedural rules in the course of adjudication. Article III's
references to "courts" and "judicial power" have long been under-
stood to carry with them certain powers incident to all courts. Au-
thority to regulate procedure, at least in the form of judicial deci-
sions rather than prospective court rules, is assumed to be one of
those powers. If federal courts indeed possess inherent authority
over procedure, that authority presumably empowers them to
adopt procedural measures in common law fashion. This power is
not exclusive; on the contrary, Congress has wide authority to
regulate it. Nonetheless, there is likely some small core of inherent
procedural authority that Congress cannot reach.
This explanation captures the widely felt intuition that federal
courts possess some power over procedure in their own right, but it
encounters a threshold difficulty. Although both scholars and
judges treat the proposition that federal courts possess inherent au-
thority over procedure as self-evidently true, close study of the
cases casts some doubt upon it. The inherent authority of the fed-
eral courts has been most fully explored in connection with a
court's ability to sanction misbehavior and regulate those who
serve it; federal courts have long asserted inherent authority to
hold in contempt, impose sanctions, vacate judgments for fraud,
dismiss cases for failure to prosecute, regulate the bar, and regulate
jurors.6 The tradition of directly claiming inherent authority to pre-
scribe procedural regulations, by contrast, is relatively weak, and it
is doubtful whether the list of well-recognized inherent powers can
6 See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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be understood as recognizing a broad power to control any matter
related to internal judicial administration.
Because courts treat the existence of inherent authority as turn-
ing on history, Part III will carefully examine the historical record,
focusing on the period between 1789 and 1820. It will canvass the
framing and ratification debates, the history surrounding the adop-
tion of the early judiciary and process acts, the case law, and con-
temporary treatises, all with a view toward determining whether
federal courts in this period understood themselves to possess in-
herent procedural authority. It will conclude that while the histori-
cal record is mixed, the record is strong enough to support the
proposition that Article III itself authorizes courts to regulate pro-
cedure in the absence of congressional authorization.
Inherent procedural authority, while important, is limited. Part
IV will point out that any procedural authority conferred by Arti-
cle III is entirely local.7 In other words, Article III empowers a
court to regulate its own proceedings, but it does not empower a
reviewing court to supervise the proceedings of a lower court by
prescribing procedures that the lower court must follow. That is so
because Article III vests "the judicial Power" in each Article III
court. To the extent that "the judicial Power" carries with it the
power to regulate procedure in the course of adjudicating cases,
each court possesses that power in its own right. To be sure, an ap-
pellate court can set aside a rule adopted by a lower court on the
ground that the rule exceeds the bounds of the lower court's au-
thority. But, the content of any procedure adopted pursuant to in-
herent procedural authority lies fundamentally within the discre-
tion of the adopting court. As a result, inherent procedural
authority does not enable the development of procedural doctrines
that are uniform across jurisdictions.
Standing alone, then, neither the traditional explanation for fed-
eral common law nor the argument from inherent authority fully
explains the procedural common lawmaking powers of the federal
courts. Taken together, however, they provide a fairly complete
explanation for what federal courts actually do and have done
since 1789. The inherent procedural authority of courts supple-
'See infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text. See generally Amy Coney Barrett,
The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 324 (2006).
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ments the common lawmaking authority that they can otherwise
claim over procedure. The straightforward analogy to the substan-
tive common lawmaking power of federal courts is right, so far as it
goes. In the area of federal judicial procedure, as in the substantive
areas of constitutional preemption, federal courts can develop uni-
form federal rules when Congress fails to do so. This procedural
common law differs from substantive common law only in that it
(like the old federal general common law) does not bind state
courts. Federal court power over procedure, however, does not end
there. In addition to this common law power to adopt uniform fed-
eral rules, each federal court possesses inherent authority to regu-
late its own proceedings. The resulting body of law is a mix of uni-
form doctrines largely drawn from general law (much like the law
of admiralty or interstate relations) and narrower rules and discre-
tionary measures associated with the inherent authority of individ-
ual courts.
These dual strands of judicially crafted procedural regulation are
evident in both the early and modern cases. In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, uniform procedural doctrines were drawn
from the general law, which courts understood themselves to apply
rather than make. When there were matters that neither the en-
acted law nor general law governed, courts relied on inherent pro-
cedural authority to regulate the proceedings before them. Cases
from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries contain the same two
threads. The uniform procedural doctrines applied by modern
courts are the descendants of the procedural doctrines of the old
general common law. Preclusion and abstention, both of which
have long historical roots, are good examples. These doctrines re-
semble the old general procedural common law in both their con-
tent-which has, in the main, stayed constant over time-and their
development-which now, as then, is mediated by tradition and
consensus. Even though modern, positivist federal courts under-
stand themselves to make these doctrines, innovations in them (for
example, the abandonment of preclusion's mutuality requirement)
are not usually abrupt departures from traditional principles.
Rather, they are usually responses to emergent consensus about
the need for change. And when neither tradition, emergent con-
sensus, nor the enacted law governs a particular procedural mat-
ter-in other words, when the content of the rule is entirely in the
818 [Vol. 94:813
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discretion of the adopting court-modern federal courts, like their
predecessors, typically treat any action they take as an exercise of
inherent procedural authority. Such rules tend to address narrow,
isolated topics. For example, the early Supreme Court relied upon
its inherent procedural authority to adopt a rule setting forth the
procedure for serving process;' more recently, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the authority of a federal court to adopt a rule gov-
erning the time in which a case must be brought.9
These two strands of procedural common law hardly fall within
watertight categories. On the contrary, they are sometimes inde-
pendent and sometimes overlapping, and that renders this body of
law complex. Nonetheless, they reflect a longstanding practice in
the federal courts of permitting flexibility and creativity to stand
alongside uniform doctrines mediated by tradition and consensus.
Recognizing these two strands of authority not only sheds light on
the different ways in which federal courts regulate procedure
through the case law method, but it also clarifies the role of federal
courts vis-A-vis Congress with respect to procedure. Claims of ex-
clusive authority are rooted in inherent authority; thus, to the ex-
tent that there are any matters insulated from congressional con-
trol, they fall within the category of matters that each court has the
authority to self-regulate. There can be no claim of exclusivity, by
contrast, with respect to procedural doctrines that bind the judicial
branch as a whole. Uniform federal procedural common law, like
all federal common law, is wholly subject to congressional abroga-
tion.
I. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW
Substantive common law is the lens through which the common
law powers of the federal courts are generally viewed. This Part
thus begins with a brief account of the power that federal courts
possess to develop substantive common law. It then develops in
more detail the propositions that procedural common law exists
and that it exists outside of the traditional account of common law.
To that end, this Part introduces five doctrines representative of
procedural common law: abstention, forum non conveniens, stare
8 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,480 (1793).
'Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 n.29 (1972).
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decisis, remittitur, and preclusion. As this Part explains, each of
these doctrines is "procedural" insofar as it is concerned with regu-
lating court processes, and each is "common law" insofar as it is
judge-made rather than the product of textual interpretation. If
federal courts are generally at pains to identify a justification for
proceeding when they develop substantive common law, the oppo-
site is true when they develop procedural common law. While all of
the doctrines described below are rooted in the fabric of federal
law, the basis of the courts' authority to develop them is almost en-
tirely unexplored.
A. Substantive Common Law
Discussions of federal common law typically begin with a refer-
ence to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and its famous holding that
"[t]here is no federal general common law."' Erie marked a sea
change in the way federal courts approached their common law
powers. Before Erie, one might have described the common law
powers of the federal courts as broad but shallow: federal courts
freely articulated common law on a broad range of matters, but the
principles they articulated applied only in federal courts. After
Erie, one might describe the common law powers of the federal
courts as narrow but deep: federal courts make common law in in-
stances "few and restricted,"" but the principles they articulate
bind state as well as federal courts. Erie (and its progeny) thus gave
something to both state and federal courts. On the one hand, state
courts received the benefit of a general rule rendering state com-
mon law (or, more precisely, "the unwritten law of the State as de-
clared by its highest court' 12) controlling even in federal courts. On
the other hand, federal courts received the reciprocal benefit of
that rule's exception. Federal courts make common law only rarely,
but when they do, it has preemptive bite. 3
10304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
"Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004) (noting that after Erie, federal courts dropped their claim of
general common lawmaking competence and "withdrew to havens of specialty").
12 Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.
" See Friendly, supra note 2, at 405 ("Erie led to the emergence of a federal deci-
sional law in areas of national concern that is truly uniform because, under the su-
premacy clause, it is binding in every forum, and therefore is predictable and useful as
Procedural Common Law
The Supreme Court has said that unless Congress authorizes it,
"federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those
concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, in-
terstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights
of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty
cases."' 4 The justification for common law made without statutory
authorization is that certain enclaves of federal interest are "so
committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to
federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where
necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit
statutory directive) by the courts."'" In other words, the enclaves
identified by the Court are areas in which the structure of our fed-
eral system prohibits state law from controlling.'6 If a case or con-
troversy arises in one of these areas and Congress fails to articulate
a uniform federal standard that would decide it, the federal courts
must supply a federal standard in the form of a common law rule.
As Professor Alfred Hill put it, "[t]he silence of Congress [in an
area committed to federal control], far from silencing the federal
courts, is precisely what calls upon them to speak."'7 In doing so,
however, the judiciary functions only as a placeholder for Con-
gress. If Congress subsequently adopts conflicting regulation, fed-
eral common law must give way to federal statute.
its predecessor, more general in subject matter but limited to the federal courts, was
not."); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Cus-
tomary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 Harv. L. Rev.
869, 878-79 (2007) (describing this preemptive bite as the "basic animating principle
of post-Erie federal common law").
Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
Boyle v. United Techs. 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988); see also Alfred Hill, The Law-
Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 Colum. L. Rev.
1024, 1025 (1967) ("[T]here are areas of federal preemption, created by force of the
Constitution, in which the federal courts formulate rules of decision without guidance
from statutory or constitutional standards .... ").
16To be sure, this explanation of federal common law is neither perfect, see Jay
Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev.
585, 623-27 (2006) (describing strengths and weaknesses of the preemption theory),
nor uniformly accepted, see, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in
the Allocation of Judicial Power 119-48 (2d ed. 1990) (advocating a narrower view);
Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 805, 805 (1989) (advocat-
ing a broader view). I do not here engage the debate regarding the proper justification
for the federal courts' power to make substantive federal common law. For present
purposes, I assume the correctness of the traditional explanation.
17 Hill, supra note 15, at 1042.
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Federal common law exists, of course, outside of the above-
described enclaves. As the Supreme Court's doctrinal formulation
suggests, federal common law also exists pursuant to congressional
authorization. Federal statutes may explicitly or implicitly author-
ize the creation of federal common law, and, as one might imagine,
determining whether a statute implicitly authorizes such creation is
frequently a difficult and contested question of statutory interpre-
tation. It is also the case that it can be difficult to distinguish fed-
eral common law made in the shadows of federal statutes from in-
terpretation of the statutory text itself. As a result, scholars
frequently point out that when all is said and done, it can be hard
to tell whether a given decision effects congressional intent or ad-
vances a judicial policy choice.18 This criticism is far more salient
when federal common law is made in the interstices of federal stat-
utes than when it is made in the enclaves of federal common law. 9
When federal common law is made in the enclaves, there is no text
giving the courts even a general sense of the direction in which
they should go; hence, there is no real argument that courts are en-
gaging in interpretation rather than making common law. The en-
claves of federal common law thus present federal common law in
its starkest, most recognizable form. Doctrinally, they also present
the most difficult question regarding the source of federal court
power: courts claiming the mantle of statutory authorization are on
firmer ground than courts striking out on their own to articulate
common law rules.
B. Contrasting Procedural Common Law
The standard account of federal common law described above
neither acknowledges nor justifies the considerable amount of pro-
cedural common law articulated by the federal courts. "Procedure"
is not included on the laundry list of enclaves in which federal
common lawmaking is justified. While Congress's ability to over-
rule substantive common law is widely recognized, its ability to
overrule procedural common law is frequently questioned.' And
's See Note, An Objection to Sosa-And to the New Federal Common Law, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 2077, 2083 (2006) (describing this phenomenon).
19 Id.
20 See infra notes 59-65.
822 [Vol. 94:813
Procedural Common Law
procedural common law, unlike substantive common law, does not
replace contrary state law.1
Before exploring the implications of these differences, however,
it is necessary to answer a threshold question: what is "procedural
common law"? This Section highlights the existence of this over-
looked body of law by briefly describing five doctrines representa-
tive of it: abstention, forum non conveniens, stare decisis, remitti-
tur, and preclusion. Each of these doctrines is "procedural" insofar
as it is primarily concerned with the regulation of court processes
and in-courtroom conduct." Each is "common law" insofar as it is
judge-made; these five doctrines resemble those developed in the
traditional enclaves of common law insofar as none pretends to in-
terpret any provision of the enacted law.23 If interpretation and
common lawmaking run along a spectrum, each of these doctrines
falls squarely on the "common law" end of it. As a result, the
common law I describe below, much like that developed in the tra-
ditional enclaves of federal common law, presents the question of
judicial authority with particular crispness. When a federal court
proceeds without any pretense of interpreting the requirements of
enacted law, it forces to the forefront the question of whether fed-
eral courts possess freestanding authority to develop a federal
common law of procedure.
It is important to be clear that these five doctrines are an illustra-
tive rather than exhaustive list of procedural common law. More-
over, in asserting that they qualify as both "procedural" and
21 See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
22 Cf. Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Consti-
tutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum. L.
Rev. 1433, 1474-75 (1984) (defining substantive rules as those "concerned principally
with policies extrinsic to litigation" and procedural rules as those designed "to en-
hance the fairness, reliability, or efficiency of the litigation process"). The status of
these five doctrines as "procedural" can also be defended by the circular argument
that procedural common law is the only kind of common law that does not bind the
states, and none of these doctrines, as a rule, applies in state courts. While this argu-
ment does not conclusively establish that any of these doctrines is procedural, it does
illustrate that both state and fedcral courts treat them as such.
23 The fact that these doctrines are "judge made" does not mean that judges have
made them up out of whole cloth. On the contrary, judges fashion much federal
common law, including procedural common law, by drawing from norms generally
accepted by the legal community. See generally Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of
General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (2006).
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"common law," I am not offering restrictive definitions of those
terms. "Procedure" and "common law" are both difficult to de-
fine,24 and I do not here attempt a definition that conclusively de-
termines whether marginal cases can be accurately described as ei-
ther "procedural" or "common law."25 The doctrines that I describe
below are ones conventionally treated as "procedural" and that
should qualify as "common law" under even the most grudging
definition of the phrase.
1. Abstention
One area in which the federal courts have developed a signifi-
cant body of procedural common law is abstention. The abstention
doctrines identify the circumstances in which federal courts deem it
appropriate to refrain from adjudicating a case to permit some
other body-typically a state court-to adjudicate it first. There
are five doctrines that permit district courts to abstain from statu-
24 On the difficulty of defining "procedure," see, for example, Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 559 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("Suffice it to
say that actually in many situations procedure and substance are so interwoven that
rational separation becomes well-nigh impossible."). For competing definitions of
"common law," compare Hill, supra note 15, at 1026 (defining "common law" nar-
rowly by excluding from its reach all rules traceable to some statutory or constitu-
tional text, no matter how tangentially), with Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1985) (defining common law
broadly to include any rule not appearing on the face of some constitutional or statu-
tory provision, "whether or not that rule can be described as the product of 'interpre-
tation' in either a conventional or an unconventional sense").
' There are many doctrines whose status as procedural common law is contestable.
For example, people might agree that a rule excluding involuntary confessions is a
common law rule, but disagree about whether that requirement is procedural or sub-
stantive. Compare McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (treating such a
rule as procedural), with Beale, supra note 22, at 1475-76 (treating it as substantive).
Similarly, people might agree that the well-pleaded complaint rule, see Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1908), is procedural, but disagree
about whether it results from common lawmaking or statutory interpretation. Com-
pare Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Ju-
risdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State
Grounds Doctrine, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1291, 1333 (1986) (treating rule as one of com-
mon law because the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not so restrict federal question ju-
risdiction), with Hill, supra note 15, at 1026 (adopting a narrower definition of com-
mon lawmaking under which the well-pleaded complaint rule would be treated as
statutory interpretation).
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torily granted jurisdiction-Colorado River, Younger, Thibodaux,
Burford, and Pullman abstention.6
Because the abstention doctrines guide the litigation process
rather than out-of-courtroom conduct, they are "procedural." Be-
cause they are prescribed by judicial decision rather than enacted
law, they are a species of "common law., 27 Indeed, one might say
that the common law status of the abstention doctrines is particu-
larly clear because they exist not only in the absence of explicit
regulation by the enacted law but in spite of explicit jurisdictional
grants in the enacted law. It is, in fact, the tension between doc-
trines emanating from judicially developed guidelines and enacted
law arguably charging federal courts to assume jurisdiction that has
made the abstention doctrines particularly controversial." Those
who defend the abstention doctrines, however, do not do so on the
ground that the doctrines are constitutionally or statutorily re-
quired. Those who defend abstention, like those who criticize it,
treat abstention as a form of common law.29 Neither those who de-
fend it nor those who criticize it have focused on the source of the
26 See Colo. River v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); La. Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1959);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-33 (1943); R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
27 See Gene R. Shreve, Pragmatism Without Politics-A Half-Measure of Authority
for Jurisdictional Common Law, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 767, 797 (1991) (dubbing the doc-
trines a kind of "jurisdictional common law"); see also Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817
(grounding propriety of dismissal in "[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to
conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation") (cita-
tions omitted); Younger, 401 U.S. at 43 (grounding abstention from issuing injunctions
against state criminal prosecutions in the policies reflected generally in certain stat-
utes and in equitable tradition); Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28 (holding that concerns of
comity justify abstention in certain circumstances even in suits at law, as opposed to
suits at equity); Burford, 319 U.S. at 333 n.29 (grounding the power to abstain in the
powers traditionally exercised by courts sitting in equity and the guidelines for its ex-
ercise in federalism); Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500-01 (justifying abstention with refer-
ence to both the traditional powers of equity courts and regard for the "harmonious
relation between state and federal authority").
28 See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 825-26 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Thibodaux, 360 U.S.
at 31-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Burford, 319 U.S. at 336, 347-48 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of
the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L.J. 71, 76-79 (1984).
29 See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 25, at 1337-42 (1986); Redish, supra note 28, at
80-84; David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 547-52,
574-75, 579-85 (1985); Shreve, supra note 27, at 769-72, 796-98.
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federal courts' authority to develop a procedural common law of
abstention.
2. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, a close cousin of absten-
tion, addresses a district court's power to dismiss a suit so that the
suit may be adjudicated in a "more convenient" forum. In deter-
mining whether another forum is better suited to adjudicate a
claim, the court considers factors of public interest, such as the
chosen forum's interest in the controversy, as well as factors of pri-
vate interest, such as the relative ease of access to proof, the rela-
tive availability of compulsory process, and the relative cost of ob-
taining the attendance of witnesses." When the balance of factors
strongly favors adjudicating the case elsewhere, the district court
can override the plaintiff's choice of forum by dismissing the case.
Insofar as forum non conveniens addresses the circumstances in
which a federal court will adjudicate a suit, it is procedural. Insofar
as it is judicially developed rather than the product of enacted law,
it is common law. 2 In fact, as is the case with abstention, forum non
conveniens might be said to exist not only in the absence of en-
acted law on point but in spite of it: forum non conveniens exists in
spite of jurisdiction and venue statutes that arguably instruct a dis-
trict court to adjudicate.3
While the courts have made clear that forum non conveniens is a
common law doctrine, they have not made clear the source of their
authority to develop it. For example, in Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, the case
widely regarded as first sanctioning a federal doctrine of forum non
conveniens, the Supreme Court did not point to any specific statu-
30 See Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
31 Id. at 508. The doctrine only applies when the more convenient forum is foreign
because 28 U.S.C. § 1404, enacted in 1948, governs transfers between United States
district courts.
32 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 507 (describing forum non conveniens as a common law
doctrine); id. at 505 n.4 (asserting that "[tihe doctrine did not originate in federal but
in state courts"); id. at 507 (observing that "[tihe federal law contains no ... express
criteria to guide the district court in exercising [the forum non conveniens] power"
but that "the common law [has] worked out techniques and criteria for dealing with
it").
33"See id. at 513 (Black, J., dissenting) (protesting forum non conveniens on this
ground).
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tory or constitutional provision that granted federal courts the
power to dismiss suits on this basis, nor did it identify the principle
that generally empowered it to create procedural common law, of
which forum non conveniens is but a part.34 Since Gulf Oil was de-
cided, judges and scholars have occasionally justified forum non
conveniens with reference to the inherent authority of federal
courts. 5 Even then, however, the fundamental proposition that
federal courts possess inherent procedural authority is assumed ra-
ther than explored.
3. Stare Decisis
Stare decisis, a doctrine adopted by courts to govern their deci-
sionmaking processes, has two forms: "horizontal" and "vertical."
Horizontal stare decisis refers to the principle that a court will fol-
low its own precedent, and vertical stare decisis refers to the prin-
ciple that a court will follow the precedent set by a higher court. In
what follows, I consider only the doctrine of horizontal stare de-
cisis, which is a more nuanced doctrine and therefore a richer ex-
ample of procedural common law.
Consider some of the rules comprising the doctrine of horizontal
stare decisis. The fundamental rule of horizontal stare decisis is
that holdings bind and dicta do not. Subsidiary rules, however, dic-
tate the strength a holding carries in particular circumstances.
Some holdings are virtually set in stone. For example, every court
of appeals forbids one panel of the court from overturning deci-
sions made by another. 6 Even those holdings open to reconsidera-
tion, however, such as those presented to a court of appeals sitting
en banc or to the Supreme Court, vary in strength. The Supreme
Court and many courts of appeals have adopted a three-tiered sys-
tem in which constitutional cases carry the weakest precedential
force, common law cases carry average precedential force, and
' Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
31 See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (including in a list of inher-
ent judicial powers the power to dismiss a case on grounds of forum non conveniens);
Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Fric-
tion on the Frontier of Inherent Power, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1147 (2006) (treating forum
non conveniens as an exercise of the judiciary's inherent power).
36 See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1011,
1017-18, 1018 n.20 (2003).
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statutory cases carry particularly strong precedential force.37 Before
overruling a common law or constitutional case (statutory cases are
rarely overruled), the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals
balance reliance interests in the precedent against arguments that
the precedent has become unworkable or has been undercut by in-
tervening law.38 None of these factors, however, is applicable in the
district courts. District courts, in contrast to the Supreme Court
and courts of appeals, generally do not observe horizontal stare de-
Courts do not purport to interpret any statutory or constitutional
text in the development of stare decisis doctrine. As both the rules
of stare decisis and their variance in the district and appellate
courts suggest, stare decisis is a doctrine comprised of judicial pol-
icy choices, and both courts and scholars characterize it as such.'
Even though the doctrine is generally regarded as a species of
common law, the question of the courts' authority to develop it is
rarely raised. Scholars have sometimes analogized the federal
courts' authority to develop the doctrine of stare decisis to their au-
thority to develop other areas of federal common law, such as ad-
miralty or interstate disputes.' Others have contended that the
power to regulate decisionmaking by adopting doctrines like stare
decisis is part of "the judicial Power" that Article III confers.42 The
37 See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317,319-21 (2005).
m See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992)
(plurality opinion).
4 Barrett, supra note 36, at 1015 & n.13.
,
0See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) ("[Sltare decisis is not an in-
exorable command, but instead reflects a policy judgment that in most matters it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Adarand Constructors v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231-35 (1995) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("'[Sltare decisis is a
principle of policy .... "' (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)); see
also John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 Duke L.J.
503, 525-29 (2000) (characterizing norms of precedent as "federal common law");
Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-
Making, 18 Const. Comment. 191, 212 (2001) (characterizing stare decisis as judicially
determined); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Con-
gress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J. 1535, 1548
(2000) ("The point is that stare decisis is a policy judgment, not a rule of law specified
in the Constitution or clearly implicit in its provisions or overall structure.").
" See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 40, at 525-29.4
, See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 40, at 202-04, 207.
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question of the courts' authority to articulate rules of stare decisis,
however, is tangential to the issues occupying scholars of the doc-
trine; there is, therefore, no settled consensus regarding the source
of federal court power to develop these rules.
4. Remittitur
Wright & Miller's well-known treatise on federal practice and
procedure describes remittitur practice as "[an excellent example
of what might be called 'federal common law of procedure'-that
is, judge-made rules of practice and procedure."43 When a district
court determines that a jury verdict is excessive, the court can ei-
ther order a new trial or give the plaintiff the option of a remitti-
tur-a denial of a motion for a new trial conditioned upon the
plaintiff's acceptance of a reduced amount of damages.' While the
grant of a new trial is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59, the order of a remittitur is not governed by any federal rule or
statute. The first case ordering a remittitur was decided by Justice
Story in 1822,"5 and the federal courts have condoned the practice
ever since.46 They have also developed common law rules guiding
its exercise. For example, in settling on the amount to be deducted
from the verdict, the majority rule is that the district court can re-
duce the verdict only to the highest amount that the jury properly
could have awarded." I have been unable to find any case or aca-
demic work discussing the source of the federal courts' authority to
develop a doctrine of remittitur.
5. Preclusion
Sometimes known by the traditional terminology "collateral es-
toppel" and "res judicata," preclusion doctrine is the body of rules
19 Wright et al., supra note 1, § 4505 n.61.
"See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,483 (1935).
, Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 762 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578) (ordering that
the case be "submitted to another jury, unless the plaintiff is willing to remit $500 of
his damages," though noting that in entering this order, "I believe that I go to the very
limits of the law").
' See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 483 (noting longevity of practice and collecting cases).
411 Wright et al., supra note 1, § 2815. There are some courts, however, that reduce
the award to the minimum amount the jury could have awarded, and still others that
reduce the verdict to whatever amount the court thinks is fair. Id.
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governing the relitigation of issues and claims. Under the rules of
claim preclusion, the existence of a judgment that is "valid," "fi-
nal," and "on the merits" extinguishes a claimant's ability to press
any other claims arising out of the same transaction or occur-
rence.48 Under the rules of issue preclusion, a party in a current suit
cannot relitigate any issue already resolved in a prior suit to which
she was a party, so long as resolution of that issue was "essential"
to a judgment that is "valid," "final," and "on the merits."'49 Claim
preclusion generally applies only to those asserting claims, not to
those defending against them; issue preclusion, by contrast, applies
to both those asserting claims and those defending against them.
Claim preclusion reaches claims that could have been litigated in
the first suit as well as claims that were actually litigated in the first
suit; issue preclusion, by contrast, reaches only those issues that
were actually litigated in the first suit. Both claim and issue preclu-
sion extend the reach of a judgment to those "in privity" with a
party bound by a judgment.
Preclusion's status as a common law doctrine is clear."° The rules
of preclusion satisfy my definition of "procedural" rules because, in
See 18A Wright et. al., supra note 1, § 4406; see also id. §§ 4428-47.491 Id. § 4416. Note that the doctrine of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion pro-
vides a limited exception to this rule insofar as it limits the circumstances under which
those who were not parties to a prior suit can assert issue preclusion against those
who were. See Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979).50 See, e.g., Semtek Int'l v. Lockheed Martin, 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) (holding that
"federal common law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal
court sitting in diversity"); United States v. Stauffer Chem., 464 U.S. 165, 176 (1984)
(White, J., concurring) (referring to the "flexible, judge-made doctrine" of collateral
estoppel); United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984) (referring to the "judi-
cially developed doctrine of collateral estoppel"); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96
(1980) ("[F]ederal courts may look to the common law or to the policies supporting
res judicata and collateral estoppel in assessing the preclusive effect of decisions of
other federal courts."). With respect to preclusion's common law pedigree, it is also
worth noting that the federal courts have not drawn the content of federal preclusion
from any statutory or constitutional provision; rather, in fashioning preclusion law,
the federal courts have drawn heavily from secondary sources and the practice of
state courts. See, c.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-55 (1979) (relying
heavily on Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Moore's Federal Practice, and law re-
view articles in identifying the fundamental precepts of preclusion); id. at 164
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (recognizing influence of secondary sources on majority
decision); Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 322-27 (1971)
(relying heavily on state cases and secondary sources in abandoning mutuality re-
quirement for defensive issue preclusion).
830
Procedural Common Law
determining the effect of federal judgments on later litigation, they
are concerned with the regulation of court processes rather than
out-of-courtroom conduct. That said, of the doctrines described in
this Section, preclusion is the one whose status as "procedural" is
most open to doubt. In Semtek International v. Lockheed Martin, a
case dealing with the peculiar problem of interjurisdictional preclu-
sion, the Supreme Court wavered between characterizing preclu-
sion as procedural and characterizing it as substantive." The
Court's indecision is a reflection of the fact that preclusion, like so
many ostensibly procedural doctrines, has substantive effects. De-
spite the uncertainty surrounding preclusion's procedural status, I
have chosen to include it here for two reasons. First, preclusion is
typically treated as procedural-witness the fact that it is a staple
of the first-year Civil Procedure class. 2 Second, and more impor-
tant, preclusion shares relevant characteristics with the other doc-
trines herein described: it falls outside of the traditionally recog-
nized enclaves of federal common law, and it does not generally
bind the states, which, outside of the context of interjurisdictional
preclusion, are free to set their own rules governing the finality of
judgments.
There has been almost no discussion in the cases of where courts
derive the authority to develop a common law of preclusion. 3 In
51 531 U.S. 497 (2001). In Semtek, the Supreme Court held that federal common law
governs the preclusive effect given all federal judgments, including judgments ren-
dered by federal courts sitting in diversity. Id. at 507-08. On the one hand, the Court
suggested that preclusion is procedural. See, e.g., id. at 501 (positing that the Confor-
mity Act, which required federal courts to follow state procedure, would have re-
quired federal courts to follow state preclusion law); id. at 509 (suggesting that federal
preclusion law is shaped by "federal courts' interest in the integrity of their own proc-
esses"). On the other hand, the Court also suggested that preclusion is substantive.
See id. at 503 (opining that if Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) governed the preclusive effect that
state courts must give federal court judgments, it might violate the Rules Enabling
Act prohibition on rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right") (ci-
tations omitted).
52Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 733, 747-48 (1986)
(describing-and criticizing-the traditional account, which treats preclusion as
"largely a reflex of procedural law").
" There have, however, been academic efforts to justify preclusion in its interjuris-
dictional form. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 52, at 764, 770 (arguing that interjuris-
dictional preclusion is a substantive doctrine justified by the need for uniform federal
rules); Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 Yale L.J. 741, 769 (1976) (ar-
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Semtek, the Supreme Court hinted that its power to formulate fed-
eral rules of preclusion rests on the same ground as its power to
formulate substantive common law: the lack of congressional guid-
ance in an area of clearly federal concern.54 The Court did not de-
velop this suggestion, however, and its other preclusion cases have
said nothing about the source of its authority. As it stands, it is fair
to say that the rules of preclusion are well understood, but the
courts' authority to make them is not.
C. The Divergence Between Common Law Theory and Procedural
Common Law
As these five doctrines illustrate, federal courts make common
law in ways for which traditional common law theory does not ac-
count. Current theories of the common lawmaking powers of the
federal courts are informed exclusively by substantive common
law. But procedural common law exists, and it differs from sub-
stantive common law in at least two significant respects.
First is the fact that procedural common law, unlike substantive
common law, is confined in its application to federal courts.55 The
states are not required to mimic, for example, the federal proce-
dural common law of forum non conveniens or remittitur. Neither
the rule that federal procedural common law is confined to federal
courts nor the reason for it, however, is explicit in the case law.56
Consequently, it is not clear whether the Supreme Court can im-
pose rules of procedural common law upon the states if it so
chooses57 or whether the Constitution limits the procedural power
guing that interjurisdictional preclusion is a procedural doctrine that federal courts
have the inherent authority to adopt).
'4 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507-08; see also Burbank, supra note 52, at 753-97.
" See Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1981) (per curiam) ("Federal
judges... may not require the observance of any special procedures [in state courts]
except when necessary to assure compliance with the dictates of the Federal Constitu-
tion."). But see supra note 51.
6 It is probably rooted in the choice-of-law principle that the procedure of the fo-
rum generally controls. Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 585 (1934) ("All
matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum.").
17 The Supreme Court has occasionally displaced state procedure without explaining
its deviation from the general rule that federal judges cannot control state procedure.
For example, in Semtek, the Supreme Court held that federal rather than state law
controls the preclusive effect that a state court must give a federal diversity judgment.
531 U.S. at 508. While this result may well be correct, in the course of reaching it, the
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of the federal courts to the federal system. 8 While this is an impor-
tant and difficult question, it is not one that this Article will ex-
plore.
A second difference between substantive and procedural com-
mon law lies in the degree to which Congress can abrogate it. No
one doubts Congress's power to abrogate substantive common
law.59 Congress's power to abrogate procedural common law, by
contrast, is open to doubt. There is substantial agreement that
Congress possesses wide authority to regulate judicial procedure.
But there is also substantial agreement that Congress's authority to
regulate judicial procedure is subject to some limit. In other words,
the disagreement centers less on the existence of a limit than on its
boundaries. Some scholars have taken a fairly restrictive view of
Congress's power to regulate procedure. For example, Professor
Gary Lawson has argued that stare decisis, burdens of proof, and
evidentiary rules, among other things, are matters within the exclu-
Supreme Court did not identify, much less resolve, the tension between this holding
and the general rule of non-displacement. Another example is the adequate and inde-
pendent state grounds doctrine. The doctrine, which is typically characterized as pro-
cedural common law, see, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Light from Dead Stars: The Pro-
cedural Adequate and Independent State Ground Reconsidered, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
1888, 1892-93 (2003), indirectly regulates state procedure insofar as it rejects some
state procedures as inadequate. Again, the Supreme Court has not reconciled this
doctrine with the general rule that federal procedural common law regulates only
federal courts. Id. (describing the theoretical confusion surrounding the question
whether the Court has the power to displace state judicial procedure).
5 The Court's failure to identify the boundaries of federal procedural common law
vis-A-vis the states is not unique; the Court has been equally unclear about the extent
of Congress's authority to regulate state judicial procedure. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr.,
Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 Yale L.J. 947, 949 (2001) ("The
bounds of federal authority over the way state courts conduct their business have re-
mained undefined for over 200 years."). In the context of congressional regulation of
state judicial procedure, Professor Bellia has drawn from traditional conflict-of-laws
principles to conclude that the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states exclusive
control over judicial enforcement of state law. See id. at 972-73. If he is correct, the
Tenth Amendment would not only limit the ability of Congress to regulate state judi-
cial procedure, but it would also limit the ability of federal courts to regulate state ju-
dicial procedure. That is not to say, however, that judicial power to regulate state pro-
cedure would necessarily be coextensive with that of Congress.
" Cf. Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political
Perspectives, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 697, 708 (1995) ("[N]o one could seriously doubt that
a legislature has the authority to supersede common law rules by appropriate legisla-
tive action.").
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sive control of the judicial branch.' Similarly, Professor David
Engdahl has argued that Congress lacks the power to "curtail or
delimit judicial abstention"'" and that the Rules Enabling Act is
"subject to serious constitutional doubt" insofar as it permits Con-
gress to postpone and even prohibit judicial rulemaking in certain
areas.62 Other scholars take a more expansive view of congressional
power than do Professors Lawson and Engdahl. For example, both
Professor John Harrison and Professor Michael Paulsen have
claimed, contrary to Professor Lawson, that Congress possesses the
authority to abrogate stare decisis.63 Even scholars taking a more
expansive view, however, stop short of characterizing Congress's
power as unbounded. Professor Paulsen acknowledges that a con-
gressional attempt to, say, forbid concurrences, dissents, or the ci-
tation of prior opinions may well transgress the limits of Congress's
authority.'4 Similarly, the Supreme Court, while typically acquiesc-
ing in congressional regulation, has deliberately left open the ques-
tion whether some procedural matters lie wholly within the judici-
ary's discretion.65 Whatever the limits of congressional authority,
60 Lawson, supra note 40, at 212-14, 220.
61 David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial
Branch, 1999 BYU L. Rev. 75, 168 (1999).
62 Id. at 172-73. Cf. Michael M. Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Con-
gress Did Not Write into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 167, 178-79,
182-84 (1979) (arguing that Congress can prescribe rules of evidence for the federal
courts, but federal courts possess the power to supersede those rules if they prefer
others). Engdahl also challenges Congress's power to regulate prudential standing
doctrine, supra note 61, at 165-66, the choice of appropriate relief, id. at 170-71, bur-
dens of proof, id. at 173, and the time within which cases must be decided, id. at 173-
74. Like Gary Lawson, Engdahl argues that the Anti-Injunction Act is unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 169.
63 See Harrison, supra note 40, at 504 ("Congress has substantial authority to legis-
late concerning the rules of precedent in federal court."); Paulsen, supra note 40 (ar-
guing that Congress can abrogate stare decisis by statute).
' Paulsen, supra note 40, at 1590, 1591 n.154.65 Because Congress has not generally imposed onerous procedural regulation on
the judiciary, the Supreme Court has had little occasion to address the question of
whether particular regulations transgress Congress's authority. It has repeatedly im-
plied, however, that limits exist. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 350 (2000) (re-
serving the question of whether "there could be a time constraint on judicial action
that was so severe that it implicated.., separation of powers concerns"); Herron v. S.
Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94-95 (1931) (implying that Congress lacks the power to require
federal courts to follow state statutes "which would interfere with the appropriate
performance of [the function of a federal court]," such as regulations regarding what
materials jurors can take into deliberations, whether a jury must answer a special ver-
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the widely shared sense that some limit exists reflects an implicit
judgment that judicial authority over procedure is different in kind
than its authority over substance. The next Part turns to the ques-
tion of authority.
II. THREE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF PROCEDURAL AUTHORITY
This Part explores three potential justifications for the authority
of the federal courts to develop procedural common law. It first
considers whether any statute generally confers upon federal
courts procedural common lawmaking authority. It then considers
whether, in the absence of statutory authority, any constitutional
justification exists for this form of common law. Two constitutional
arguments might justify procedural common law. First, one might
draw a straightforward analogy to the substantive common law-
making powers of the federal courts by arguing that procedure, like
other areas of federal common law, is an enclave in which federal
interests are so strong that common lawmaking is justified in the
absence of congressional regulation. Second, one might treat Arti-
cle III's grant of "the judicial Power" as imbuing courts, either di-
rectly or indirectly, with authority to fashion rules of procedure.
A. Potential Statutory Justifications
A threshold question in analyzing the legitimacy of federal pro-
cedural common law is whether Congress has authorized its crea-
tion, for if it has, the question of whether a constitutional justifica-
dict, and whether a judge has recourse to the device of a directed verdict); McDonald
v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266 (1915) (questioning whether a statute like the Conformity
Act could reach the power of federal courts to regulate the conduct of jurors); Indian-
apolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 300 (1876) (noting that the question of
whether Congress could trench upon the powers of a judge in certain matters of judi-
cial administration is "open to doubt"); Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441-42 (1875)
(implying that a statute regulating "[t]he personal administration by the judge of his
duties while sitting upon the bench" would raise a constitutional question); see also
United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 760 n.5 (1st Cir. 1994) ("It is not yet settled
whether some residuum of the courts' [inherent] power is so integral to the judicial
function that it may not be regulated by Congress (or, alternatively, may only be regu-
lated up to a certain point)."). State legislatures have gone further than Congress in
their attempts to regulate judicial procedure, and state courts have invalidated some
of those attempts as beyond the legislative authority. See A. Leo Levin & Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Legi3lative Control over Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitu-
tional Revision, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 30 (1958) (cataloguing examples).
2008]
Virginia Law Review
tion exists recedes in importance. Part I explained that no specific
statutory authorization exists for any of the five doctrines therein
described; in other words, none of those doctrines elaborates a par-
ticular statute or proceeds from a specific statutory grant in the
relevant area. It might be the case, however, that some general
statutory authority exists, even if the courts articulating such doc-
trines do not invoke it.
The broadest grant of statutory rulemaking authority to the fed-
eral courts is found in 28 U.S.C. Section 2071(a), which provides,
"The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their
business."' One might be tempted to construe this language as giv-
ing federal courts the power to prescribe common law as well as
prospective court rules. That temptation, however, is immediately
dispelled by the direction in Section 2071(b) that rules prescribed
pursuant to this grant "shall be prescribed only after giving appro-
priate public notice and an opportunity to comment," as well as
Section 2071(d)'s requirement that copies of such rules be distrib-• • 67
uted to various bodies. These directions clearly do not contem-
plate rules worked out on a common law basis. Thus, read in light
of the subsections that follow it, Section 2071(a)'s statutory grant
clearly authorizes federal courts to "prescribe rules" through the
process of rulemaking, not adjudication.
There are, to be sure, federal rules implementing 28 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 2071 that might be read to expand this statutory grant. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 83 and Federal Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 47 detail the means by which district courts and courts of ap-
peals, respectively, may promulgate local rules. At the end of each
rule is a safety-valve provision, granting a district judge or court of
appeals the power to adopt procedures in the absence of a federal
statute, federal rule, or local rule on point. The language of these
provisions is fairly broad. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(b)
provides that when there is no law controlling, "[a] judge may
regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law."' In
the same vein, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47(b) provides
28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2000).
67 id.
' Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(b) (emphasis added).
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that in the absence of controlling law, "[a] court of appeals may
regulate practice in a particular case in any manner consistent with
federal law."69 Thus, both of these rules might be read to grant the
federal courts a power that 28 U.S.C. Section 2071 does not: the
power to regulate procedure by the development of common law. °
Despite the breadth of the language, it is not at all clear that ei-
ther Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(b) or Federal Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure 47(b) authorizes procedural common law in the
sense of generally applicable rules worked out by judges on a case-
by-case basis.7' Even assuming that they do, these rules fall under
the weight of an objection raised by Professor Stephen Burbank.
To the extent that these rules themselves purport to confer com-
mon lawmaking power on federal judges, they are invalid. Con-
gress can confer common lawmaking power on federal judges, but
federal judges cannot confer such power on themselves. Neither
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 nor Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 83 is a federal statute; both are products of the statuto-
rily authorized rulemaking process supervised by the Supreme
Court. Both Rules 47 and 83 implement the grant of local rulemak-
ing authority conferred by 28 U.S.C. Section 2071, but that grant,
as discussed above, is not a grant of common law authority. The
Federal Rules cannot give power that Congress has not. Thus, even
assuming that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47(b) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(b) refer to the development of
procedural common law, they are best understood as provisions
simply clarifying the judiciary's view that neither these provisions
authorizing local rulemaking nor the Enabling Act itself stamps out
any common law power over procedure that the judiciary other-
wise possesses.
" Fed. R. App. P. 47(b) (emphasis added).
70 See Burbank, supra note 52, at 773-74 & n.192 (assuming that these rules purport
to confer upon federal courts the power to make procedural common law).
7 The Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(b) reveal
that its drafters did not necessarily expect that regulation in a form other than local
rules would be in the form of traditional common law doctrine. The Notes refer only
to "internal operating procedures, standing orders, and other internal directives."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 83.
72 See Burbank, supra note 52, at 773-74.
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B. Constitutional Preemption and Procedural Common Law
In the absence of statutory authority to develop procedural
common law, it is necessary to consider whether some constitu-
tional justification exists. It makes sense to begin with a theory that
tracks the justification for federal substantive common law.73 As
described in Part I, the standard account of the substantive com-
mon lawmaking powers of the federal courts identifies certain en-
claves in which the Constitution impliedly prohibits state law from
controlling. In these enclaves, some federal law must govern. The
prerogative to specify federal law belongs to Congress, but if Con-
gress does not act, the theory goes, the federal courts must. 4 One
can see how this logic might apply to the area of procedure.
It is well established that the procedure observed by the federal
courts is a matter that the Constitution commits exclusively to fed-
eral control. The first and most forceful statement of this principle
appeared in Wayman v. Southard:
That [the power to regulate federal court procedure] has not an
independent existence in the State legislatures, is, we think, one
of those political axioms, an attempt to demonstrate which,
would be a waste of argument not to be excused. The proposition
has not been advanced by counsel in this case, and will, probably,
never be advanced. Its utter inadmissibility will at once present
itself to the mind, if we imagine an act of a State legislature for
"This approach is suggested, though not fleshed out, in some of the literature and
case law. See, e.g., Matasar & Bruch, supra note 25, at 1323-25 (drawing an analogy
between the substantive and procedural common lawmaking powers of the federal
courts); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Lim-
its on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 761, 778 (1997) (hypothesizing that proce-
dural common law might be conceptualized as "specialized federal common law,"
analogous to the other forms of federal common law that survived Erie). This also ap-
pears to be the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Semtek, where the Court's
approach to the articulation of a common law rule-invocation of a federal interest-
resembled the approach it takes when articulating rules within the enclaves of federal
common law. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. See also Tidmarsh & Murray,
supra note 16, at 594, 610-14 (opining that Semtek effectively added preclusion to the
existing enclaves of federal common law).
" See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) ("When Congress has
not spoken to a particular issue, however, and when there exists a 'significant conflict
between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law,' the Court has found
it necessary, in a 'few and restricted' instances, to develop federal common law.") (ci-
tations omitted).
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the direct and sole purpose of regulating proceedings in the
Courts of the Union, or of their officers in executing their judg-
ments. No gentleman, we believe, will be so extravagant as to
maintain the efficacy of such an act.75
The Wayman Court went on to argue that the states could not do
indirectly what they could not do directly, and thus that it was al-
most equally extravagant to maintain that state laws regulating the
procedure of state courts somehow extended of their own force to
federal courts as well.76 The regulation of federal judicial procedure
belongs to the federal government.
Given that federal judicial procedure is an area of constitutional
preemption, one can analogize the federal courts' power to articu-
late procedural common law to their power to articulate substan-
tive common law. State law cannot govern federal procedure-just
as the Court has held that it cannot govern admiralty, interstate
disputes, certain cases involving the rights and obligations of the
federal government, and certain matters of foreign affairs. Con-
gress possesses authority to regulate federal judicial procedure
pursuant to both the Inferior Tribunals Clause and the Sweeping
Clause. 7 If Congress has not exercised its power to regulate some
' 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 49 (1825). The insistence that the federal government has
exclusive control over the procedure of its own courts is presumably the flip side of
the principle that each state has nearly exclusive control over its own judicial proce-
dure. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
7623 U.S. at 49-50. See also Fullerton v. Bank of the United States, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
604, 607 (1828) (asserting that state legislatures can have no control, direct or indirect,
over federal court process). That is not to say, of course, that Congress cannot direct
the federal courts to observe state procedure, and Congress has done just that on a
number of occasions. For example, the Process and Conformity Acts, described infra
Subsection III.B.2, both directed federal courts to apply state procedure. But in that
situation, state procedure applies to federal courts by virtue of a federal law, much
like the situation in which federal courts choose state law as the operative rule of fed-
eral common law. See Beers v. Haughton, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 329, 359 (1835) ("The
whole efficacy of such laws in the courts of the United States, depends upon the en-
actments of congress. So far as they are adopted by congress they are obligatory. Be-
yond this, they have no controlling influence.").
17 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1964) ("[T]he constitutional provision for
a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with
it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those
courts .... ). In addition to empowering Congress to make laws "necessary and
proper" to the execution of Congress's own enumerated powers, the Sweeping Clause
empowers Congress to make laws "necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion.., all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
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aspect of federal court procedure, federal courts may develop
common law rules to fill the void. In other words, as is the case
with respect to substantive federal common law, Congress's failure
to act in an area of exclusively federal concern effectively empow-
ers federal courts to do so."
But this account rings only partly true, because it fails to account
for a potentially significant difference between procedural and sub-
stantive federal common law: the fact that power may be distrib-
uted differently between Congress and the federal courts on mat-
ters of procedure than on matters of substance. Congress's power
clearly dominates that of the federal courts in the traditional en-
claves of federal common law.79 When federal courts make com-
mon law on matters of admiralty, international relations, interstate
disputes, or the rights and obligations of the United States, they are
not speaking on matters within their particular competence. They
cannot claim expertise superior to that of Congress in any of these
areas, nor can they claim that the Constitution grants them regula-
tory authority superior to that of Congress in any of these areas.'
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. By its
terms, this portion of the Sweeping Clause enables Congress to make laws carrying
into execution the judicial power.
78 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. To be sure, procedural common law
would still differ from substantive common law in that it does not-and likely can-
not-replace contrary state law.
"The accompanying text describes the conventional view regarding the balance of
congressional and judicial authority in the enclaves of federal common law. Richard
H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System
735 (5th ed. 2003) ("Federal statutes, of course, prevail over contrary federal common
law...."). There have been, however, occasional suggestions that in the areas of ad-
miralty and interstate disputes, the lawmaking authority of the federal courts might
exceed that of Congress. See id. at 732-35 & n.5 (noting this argument with respect to
admiralty); id. at 738-39 n.11 (noting this argument with respect to interstate dis-
putes). The theory is that because the courts' lawmaking authority in these two areas
derives at least in part from jurisdictional grants in Article III, it might be slightly
broader than that of Congress. Id; see also Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative
Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1214,
1230-35 (1954) (describing ultimately defeated arguments to this effect in the context
of admiralty). If this is the case, there may be at least a narrow slice of the common
law of admiralty and interstate disputes, respectively, that Congress cannot abrogate,
and it would therefore be incorrect to describe all common lawmaking authority in
the traditional enclaves as derivative of or subservient to that of Congress.
o See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) ("Nothing in this proc-
ess [of common lawmaking] suggests that courts are better suited to develop national
policy in areas governed by federal common law than they are in other areas, or that
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On the contrary, within each of the traditional enclaves of federal
common law, Congress is widely acknowledged to be the preferred
regulator. This understanding is reflected in the deferential posture
that federal courts assume relative to Congress on matters of sub-
stantive common law. In making substantive common law, the ju-
diciary effectively functions as a placeholder for Congress. Judicial
authority exists only because Congress has left a statutory void,
and if Congress subsequently chooses to fill that void, judicial au-
thority over it dissipates. Substantive common law is wholly subject
to congressional override.
The assertion that Congress's power dominates that of the fed-
eral courts in matters of procedure is far less certain. When federal
courts make procedural common law, they are speaking on a mat-
ter within their particular competence-indeed, with respect to
matters of procedure, federal courts can credibly claim that their
expertise exceeds that of Congress. Even apart from expertise,
which does not itself confer power, the federal courts have a
stronger claim to constitutional authority in matters of procedure
than in matters of substance. 81 The precise limits of Congress's au-
thority to regulate federal court procedure are a matter of dispute,
but as discussed above, courts and scholars have repeatedly argued
that there are some procedural matters that Congress cannot regu-
late.' Whether or not any of these particular arguments is sound,
the fact that they are often raised reflects an intuition that at least
some aspects of federal court procedure lie beyond congressional
control. A complete theory of procedural common law must ac-
count for the source of judicial authority to act in those areas
where Congress lacks the authority to regulate. If a federal court
adopts procedures for itself that Congress could not impose upon
it, the court's power to do so necessarily derives from something
more than congressional inaction in an area of federal concern. In
the usual and important concerns of an appropriate division of functions between the
Congress and the federal judiciary are inapplicable.").
"' Consider that in Wayman v. Southard, Chief Justice Marshall denied that Con-
gress could delegate to the courts "powers which are strictly and exclusively legisla-
tive." 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825). Marshall went on, however, to uphold
Congress's delegation to the courts of the authority to promulgate court rules; thus,
he necessarily viewed authority over procedure as a matter over which Congress and
the courts share authority. Id. at 43.
' See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
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other words, the power would have to be something that the court
possesses in its own right, rather than something that accrues to it
solely by default.83
None of this is to say that authority over procedure is the exclu-
sive province of the courts. It is simply to say that the relationship
between Congress and the courts in the area of procedure is
probably more complicated than the relationship between Con-
gress and the courts in matters of substance, and that in the area of
procedure, there must be more to the story. The next Section ex-
plores whether Article III confers inherent procedural authority
upon federal courts.
C. Inherent Authority over Procedure
A long and well-established tradition maintains that some pow-
ers are inherent in federal courts simply because Article III de-
nominates them "courts" in possession of "the judicial power."'" In
other words, inherent powers are those so closely intertwined with
a court's identity and its business of deciding cases that a court pos-
sesses them in its own right, even in the absence of enabling legisla-
tion. The inherent powers of a federal court are not beyond con-
gressional control; on the contrary, there is a large area of shared
space in which the courts can act in the absence of enabling legisla-
tion but must acquiesce in the face of it.8" Nonetheless, there are
limits to what Congress can do in regulating the courts' inherent
power. For example, Congress can impose some procedural re-
quirements upon the exercise of the contempt power, which is an
inherent power of every court.86 It cannot, however, wholly with-
83 Similarly, if one were to take the view that judicial power exceeds congressional
power in the areas of admiralty and interstate disputes, see supra note 79, one would
emphasize that judicial power in these areas arises from a combination of structural
inference and jurisdictional grant, rather than from structural inference alone.
See, e.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)
("Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the na-
ture of their institution.... To fine for contempt-imprison for contumacy-inforce
the observance of order, &c. are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court,
because they are necessary to the exercise of all others ....").
See Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985) (asserting that procedural rules
adopted pursuant to inherent authority cannot conflict with statutory or constitutional
provisions).
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873).
842 [Vol. 94:813
2008] Procedural Common Law 843
draw that power or, even short of that, impose regulations that
would cripple courts in its exercise. '
In a significant number of cases, the Supreme Court has identi-
fied procedure as a matter over which federal courts possess inher-
ent authority.' Almost all of the Court's claims to inherent proce-
dural authority occur in the context of the so-called "supervisory
power" doctrine. 9 There are, however, a handful of cases in which
the Court has claimed inherent procedural authority for federal
courts even outside the context of that doctrine. In some of these
" Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924) (acknowledging congres-
sional power to regulate judicial contempt power but asserting that "the attributes
which inhere in that power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor
rendered practically inoperative").
' As others have observed, see, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and
Power: The Role of Congress, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1677, 1681 (2004), the cases
and scholarship often fail to distinguish between initiating authority (the ability to act
in the absence of congressional regulation) and exclusive authority (the ability to act
in the face of contrary congressional direction); between authority that is local (em-
powering a court to regulate the proceedings before it) and authority that is supervi-
sory (empowering a court to regulate the proceedings of a lower court); and between
procedural regulation in the form of court rules and procedural regulation in the form
of judicial decisions. In light of the uncertainty that often surrounds this issue, let me
be clear here: both this Section and the next Part are concerned with the question of
whether the judiciary possesses an initiating, local authority to regulate procedure in
the form of judicial decisions.
"
9See, e.g., Thomas, 474 U.S. at 146 ("[C]ourts of appeals have supervisory powers
that permit, at the least, the promulgation of procedural rules governing the manage-
ment of litigation."); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) ("[IJn the ex-
ercise of supervisory powers, federal courts may, within limits, formulate procedural
rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress."); Rosales-Lopez
v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190 (1981) (asserting supervisory authority to adopt a
rule requiring certain questions to be asked on voir dire); United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225, 231 (1975) (acknowledging the judiciary's inherent power to adopt rules re-
garding discovery in criminal cases); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 n.29 (1972)
(acknowledging supervisory power of a federal court to adopt a rule governing the
time in which cases must be brought); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)
(asserting authority to prescribe a rule regulating qualifications for jury service in the
absence of congressional or constitutional authorization); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943) (holding that the Court has inherent supervisory power to
fashion rules of evidence). Courts asserting "supervisory power" sometimes use it to
refer to a court's authority over its own proceedings and sometimes use it to refer to a
court's authority to supervise the proceedings of inferior courts. See Barrett, supra
note 7, at 330 (describing varied use of term). The cases cited here are of both sorts.
For present purposes, I am not concerned with whether a federal court adopts a rule
for itself or a lower court but rather with the variety of topics that courts have claimed
the inherent authority to regulate.
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cases, the Court has explicitly asserted that federal courts possess
inherent authority to formulate rules of procedure in the course of
adjudication.' In others, the Court has addressed not so much the
authority to prescribe procedural rules as the authority to take ac-
tions related to the progress of a suit.9' Perhaps because of these
cases, and perhaps because the idea makes good sense, scholars
have echoed these assertions.'
In light of these cases, the argument grounding authority to
make procedural common law in the inherent authority of the fed-
eral courts is straightforward: Federal courts have inherent author-
9 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965) (identifying "'matters
which relate to the administration of legal proceedings, [as] an area in which federal
courts have traditionally exerted strong inherent power, completely aside from the
powers Congress expressly conferred in the Rules"' (quoting Lumbermen's Mutual
Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963))); Funk v. United States, 290
U.S. 371, 382 (1933) (asserting that courts, "by right of their own powers," can formu-
late rules of evidence); In re Hien, 166 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1897) ("The general rule un-
doubtedly is that courts of justice possess the inherent power to make and frame rea-
sonable rules not conflicting with express statute ... ."); Mitchell v. Overman, 103
U.S. 62, 64 (1880) (referring to the "rules of practice which obtain in courts of justice
in virtue of the inherent power they possess"); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 66, 98 (1861) ("[I]n all cases where original jurisdiction is given by the Consti-
tution, this court has authority to exercise it without any further act of Congress to
regulate its process .... ).I See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) ("The District Court has broad
discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket.");
Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 101 (1991) ("[N]ormally courts have inherent
power, among other things, to remand cases ... "); Luce v. United States, 469 U.S.
38, 41 n.4 (1984) ("Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly author-
ize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's inher-
ent authority to manage the course of trials."); Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248,
254 (1936) ("[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in
every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy .... );
Enelow v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 381-82 (1935) (asserting that a federal
court can stay proceedings "by virtue of its inherent power to control the progress of
the cause so as to maintain the orderly processes of justice"); Ex parte Peterson, 253
U.S. 300, 312 (1920) ("Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the con-
trary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required
for the performance of their duties."); Logan v. Patrick, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 288, 288-89
(1809) (recognizing equitable discretion to stay proceedings).
9 See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 7, at 334-35; Beale, supra note 22, at 1468-73 (assert-
ing that federal courts have implied constitutional authority to regulate procedure);
Engdahl, supra note 61, at 83-86 (arguing that Article III's vesting of judicial power
vests courts with power over, inter alia, procedure); Merrill, supra note 24, at 24 (as-
serting that courts have inherent authority to adopt procedures for themselves in the
absence of congressional authorization).
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ity to adopt procedures governing litigation before them; thus, they
have the authority to develop procedural common law. Their in-
herent power over procedure authorizes them to act in the absence
of enabling legislation, but if Congress acts, the courts must gener-
ally give way. There are, nonetheless, limits to what Congress can
do. It cannot wholly withdraw the courts' power over procedure,
and there are some-albeit few-procedural matters that are en-
tirely beyond congressional regulation. Article III, in sum, allocates
to federal courts a special role in regulating this area committed to
exclusive federal control.
This argument thus fits neatly with prevailing assumptions about
federal court power insofar as it treats procedure, unlike substance,
as an area in which federal courts can assert authority in their own
right. That said, it encounters a threshold difficulty: despite the
relative consensus on the point, it is not so clear that power over
procedure can fairly be treated as an inherent power of federal
courts. The proposition that federal courts possess inherent author-
ity over procedure is treated as self-evident.93 Closer examination,
however, reveals that the concept of inherent judicial authority has
been almost entirely fleshed out in contexts other than procedural
regulation. Inherent judicial authority has received the most sus-
tained attention in the context in which it was first asserted: con-
tempt." In addition to the contempt power, courts have asserted
inherent authority to vacate judgments for fraud, 5 to dismiss cases
for failure to prosecute, 6 and to impose other sorts of sanctions on
undesirable behavior. 7 They have also asserted inherent authority
See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 7, at 335.
The first case to recognize explicitly the inherent authority of federal courts is
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, which asserted in dicta that federal courts pos-
sess inherent authority to punish contempt. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). The fed-
eral courts have consistently reasserted that authority. See Young v. United States ex
rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795 & n.7 (1987) (collecting cases recognizing
inherent judicial authority to punish contempt).
95See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,244 (1944).
See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962).
97See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 46-51 (1991) (holding that federal
courts possess inherent authority to shift attorneys' fees for bad-faith conduct);
Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (holding that a court has inherent
power to shift attorney's fees as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery orders
and a court-ordered briefing schedule).
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to regulate court personnel like jurors and lawyers.9 In short, the
overwhelming majority of cases dealing with inherent judicial au-
thority are those asserting either a semi-punitive power or the
power to control those who serve the court. By comparison, the
cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized an inherent
power to prescribe procedural rules or otherwise manage the proc-
ess of litigation are relatively few.99 Thus, while modern scholarship
and case law support the proposition that federal courts possess in-
herent authority over procedure, that proposition is not as solid as
it initially appears. The next Part tests the frequently asserted but
rarely developed proposition that federal courts possess some in-
herent authority over procedure.
III. INHERENT AUTHORITY OVER PROCEDURE
A. Constitutional Text and Structure
The Constitution does not, on its face, grant federal courts
power over procedure. Nonetheless, it is a well-established princi-
ple of constitutional law that Congress, the Executive, and the ju-
diciary each possess certain powers granted by, though not ex-
pressly mentioned in, the Constitution. Thus, for example,
Congress is acknowledged to possess the power to punish con-
tempts of its authority, even though no such power is expressly
conferred by Article I." The Executive is acknowledged to possess
the power to function as the country's sole spokesperson in deal-
ings with foreign nations, even though no such power is explicitly
98For the regulation of jurors, see, for example, McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264,
266 (1915) (asserting inherent power of court "to inquire into the conduct of jurors"),
and Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441-42 (1875) (asserting inherent authority to de-
cide what materials jurors may take into deliberations). For the regulation of lawyers,
see, for example, In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) ("Courts have long recognized
an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers."), and Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265,
273 (1883) ("It is laid down in all the books in which the subject is treated, that a court
has power to exercise summary jurisdiction over its attorneys .... ).
"The clearest assertions of the inherent authority to prescribe procedural regula-
tions in the course of adjudication are also fairly recent. Most cases asserting inherent
procedural authority occur in the context of the "supervisory power" doctrine, which
dates to 1943. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (first articulating the
doctrine). There are few cases directly asserting inherent authority to prescribe pro-
cedure outside this line of authority.
'00See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 229 (1821).
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conferred by Article U."' And the judiciary is acknowledged to
possess the power to regulate the bar practicing before it, even
though no such power is expressly conferred by Article Il.02
At least two kinds of textual and structural constitutional argu-
ments are advanced in support of nonexpress constitutional power.
One kind of argument focuses on the relevant vesting clause, ask-
ing what informed observers at the time of the Founding would
have understood that grant of power to include. For example, Pro-
fessors Saikrishna Prakash and Michael Ramsey have argued that
Article II directly vests the President with the power to conduct
foreign affairs because informed observers at the time of the
Founding understood "the executive power" to encompass such
authority. '3 In the context of Article III, Professor Scott Idleman
has maintained that,
[m]ore than a mere synonym for jurisdiction, the 'judicial Power'
encompasses those prerogatives and obligations that have cus-
tomarily attended the judicial function, particularly the Anglo-
American common law courts at the time of the framing,
whether or not such attributes are elsewhere expressly conferred
by the Constitution or affirmed by statute."
The term "inherent authority" is often used broadly to refer to
any power granted by, but not mentioned expressly in, the Consti-
tution. When used in its narrowest sense, however, "inherent au-
thority" refers specifically to the kind of authority claimed by this
first kind of constitutional argument: power inhering in that ex-
pressly granted."0 5
Another kind of argument is an instrumental one, focusing less
on cataloguing specific powers implicitly contained within the pri-
mary grant than on the more general claim that the Constitution
implicitly grants each branch the incidental authority it needs to
,0, Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231, 243 (2002) (describing wide agreement on this point despite
the lack of any explicit textual grant of the power).
,o See supra note 98 and accompanying text.103Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 101, at 252-65.
,0, Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal
Courts, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 47-48 (2001).
'05 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 62, at 179-82 (describing judicial power over some
rules of evidence as "inherent" in the judicial power itself).
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get its job done.'O6 As James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 44,
"No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than
that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wher-
ever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power
necessary for doing it is included."'" The classic judicial articula-
tion of this principle appears in McCulloch v. Maryland, which ar-
gued that each of Article I's enumerated powers carries with it the
incidental authority to take actions designed to facilitate its exer-
cise." Like the term "inherent authority," the term "implied au-
thority" is sometimes used broadly to refer to any power granted
by, but not expressly mentioned in, the Constitution.' When used
in its narrowest sense, however, the term "implied authority" refers
to the kind of power claimed by this second kind of constitutional
argument: power impliedly conferred by the constitutional struc-
ture as instrumentally necessary, or even simply useful, to that ex-
pressly granted."'
There is little or no overlap between these two arguments when
the power at issue is more fairly characterized as an end in itself
rather than as a means of executing an enumerated power. In this
circumstance, the obviously better of these two arguments is that
the relevant vesting clause directly-albeit implicitly-confers the
power at issue. Because, for example, the foreign affairs power is
more fairly characterized as an end in itself rather than a means of
"' Cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Struc-
tural Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 825 n.478 (2001) ("Implied constitutional
powers must be distinguished from powers that are expressly granted in the Constitu-
tion, but not defined.").
107 The Federalist No. 44, at 285 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
"' 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). McCulloch itself did not ground Congress's
possession of implied powers exclusively in the Sweeping Clause, although some have
argued that it should have done so. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, Implied Pow-
ers, in 2 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 964-65 (Leonard W. Levy et al.
eds., 1986). Because McCulloch's argument does not depend upon the Sweeping
Clause, its reasoning appears to extend to the executive and judicial branches, which,
like Congress, impliedly possess the power to employ means directed toward achiev-
ing the ends with which they are charged.
"' See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadows, 19 Const.
Comment. 87, 91 n.17 (2002) (using term broadly to refer to powers either implicit in
specific constitutional grants or inferred from the constitutional structure).
10 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 22, at 1468-73 (using term "implied authority" to re-
fer only to the ancillary authority the Constitution affords each branch to employ
means directed toward accomplishing the ends with which it is expressly charged).
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accomplishing an explicitly conferred power, Professors Prakash
and Ramsey do not press the instrumental argument. Instead, they
examine only whether informed observers at the time of the
Founding would have understood "the executive power" to include
the power to direct foreign affairs."'
There can be significant overlap between these two arguments,
however, when the power at issue is both instrumental and closely
related to the expressly granted authority it supports. This overlap
is evident in most, if not all, judicial claims to nonexpress power.
For example, it is well established that courts possess the power to
punish contempt even in the absence of enabling legislation. Does
that power exist because Article III directly confers it-in other
words, because informed observers at the time of the Founding
understood it to be an attribute of "the judicial Power?" Or does
the contempt power exist on an instrumental rationale-in other
words, because it is a power courts need to adjudicate cases effec-
tively? The judicial contempt power can be (and has been) justified
on either rationale."2 And not only can each of these rationales in-
dependently support the contempt power, but consider that the in-
strumental rationale can be put in the service of the argument that
the contempt power is directly conferred by Article III as an inher-
ent attribute of all courts. Those powers, which, like contempt, are
thought "necessary" to functioning as a court and exercising judi-
cial power, are often those so closely associated with the terms
"court" and "judicial power" that they are understood to be part
and parcel of them."3 Thus, where a claimed power is both suppor-
. See generally Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 101.
112 Some cases strongly imply that Article III directly vests the contempt power in
every federal court. See, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873)
("The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts .... The moment the
courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction
over any subject, they became possessed of this power."). Others treat the power as
instrumental. See, e.g., Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562-63 (3d Cir.
1985) (suggesting that the contempt power is one implied from "strict functional ne-
cessity"). Still others invoke both grounds. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
"3 See, e.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)
("Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the na-
ture of their institution.... To fine for contempt-imprison for contumacy-inforce
the observance of order, &c. are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court,
because they are necessary to the exercise of all others .... "). It is important to em-
phasize, however, that powers thought "necessary" to the exercise of expressly
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tive of and closely associated with an expressly granted power, the
instrumental rationale for implied power and the "direct vesting"
rationale for inherent power can function either as different routes
to the same end or complementary arguments along the same
route.
The authority to articulate procedure in the course of adjudica-
tion is a case in point. It is, on the one hand, authority that argua-
bly lies at the heart of the business of courts. It is, on the other
hand, instrumental to deciding cases. It is, therefore, susceptible to
the confusion that can result when arguments for "inherent" and
"implied" authority overlap. This confusion is evident in the lack of
consensus with respect to whether the Constitution directly or indi-
rectly grants the courts procedural authority. Some scholars treat
the power as directly conferred by Article 111;11. others treat it as
inferred from the constitutional structure."5 Most often, those as-
granted power are not always closely associated with the power they support. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has held that Congress possesses the power to punish con-
tempt, but it has not done so on the ground that such power has long been considered
an inherent attribute of any legislature worthy of the name. Instead, the Court has
recognized a congressional contempt power on the purely instrumental rationale that
in some situations Congress cannot accomplish its job without the ability to punish
contempt. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 225-26 (1821) (justifying
congressional contempt power on the ground that every express grant of power in the
Constitution "draw[s] after it others, not expressed, but vital to their exercise").
114 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 61, at 81-89 (characterizing power over procedure,
among other inherent powers, as directly vested in federal courts by virtue of Article
Ii); Idleman, supra note 104, at 47-52 (strongly implying that inherent judicial power,
including inherent power over procedure, derives directly from Article III's grant of
judicial power); Martin, supra note 62, at 179-86 (arguing that judicial power to de-
velop at least some rules of evidence is directly conferred by Article III as an inherent
attribute of judicial power); Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the
Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1805, 1805 (1995) (characterizing inherent
judicial power, including inherent procedural power, as "that inher[ing] in the very
nature of a judicial body").
15 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 22, at 1466-73 (explicitly rejecting argument that Ar-
ticle III directly infuses federal courts with inherent procedural authority in favor of
argument that authority is indirectly conferred as instrumentally useful to the dis-
charge of the judicial function); Pushaw, supra note 106, at 846-47 & n.576 ("In my
opinion, the function of deciding cases should be treated as the express 'judicial
power' conferred by Article III. What the Court calls 'inherent powers' are the im-
plied ones that flow from the exercise of judicial power."); William W. Van Alstyne,
The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the
Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Spring 1976, at 102, 107-11 (treating judicial authority over proce-
850
Procedural Common Law
serting the existence of nonexpress procedural authority simply fail
to specify which constitutional argument supports the claim."6
The analytical confusion surrounding claims of nonexpress judi-
cial authority, including authority over procedure, is unsatisfying,
but it has persisted for so long that it would be difficult, if not im-
possible, to untangle. Consider, for example, the difficulty this con-
fusion poses for the problem at hand. Determining whether Article
III directly confers power over procedure requires analysis of
whether the Founding generation perceived power over procedure
to be an attribute of "judicial Power" exercised by all courts. But
Founding-era sources addressing any aspect of nonexpress judicial
authority, much less procedural authority, tend to be as ambiguous
as modern ones with respect to the question of whether the power
is directly or indirectly conferred."' Thus, to the extent that any of
these sources address nonexpress procedural authority, it is diffi-
cult to say which of the two constitutional arguments they support.
Fortunately, it is possible to evaluate the claim of nonexpress
procedural authority without untangling these two arguments. At
least insofar as nonexpress judicial power is concerned, the distinc-
tion between inherent and implied incidental authority seems rela-
tively unimportant because the distinction does not, at least in this
context, give rise to a difference in methodology. As described
dure as an incidental power implied by necessity without addressing the direct vesting
argument).16 The cases in which federal courts broadly claim "inherent authority" over proce-
dure without specifying the constitutional argument supporting that claim are legion.
For just a few examples, see Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 549-50 (1998),
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505-07 (1983), and Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 472-73 (1965). See also Lear, supra note 35, at 1159-66 (using both the terms
"inherent" and "implied" to describe the federal courts' power to create procedural
devices and failing to specify whether power is directly or indirectly conferred); Ryan,
supra note 73, at 776 (similar).
17 Hudson, the flagship case regarding inherent judicial authority, illustrates the
point nicely. Because the case describes the federal courts' contempt power as arising
"from the nature of their institution," 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34, one might read the
case as supporting the notion that Article III vests the contempt power directly in all
federal courts simply by denominating them "courts" in possession of "judicial
Power." On the other hand, Hudson also points out that contempt is a power "neces-
sary to the exercise of all others." Id. That observation might be read simply as sup-
port for the "direct vesting" argument, or it might be read as support for the argu-
ment that the judiciary, like the other two branches, can employ the means necessary
to get its job done.
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above, the argument for outright grant requires a historical inquiry:
the relevant question is whether the Founding generation would
have perceived power over procedure as a part of the expressly
granted judicial power itself."8 Consider, though, that federal
courts treat all their claims to nonexpress authority as dependent
upon history. In other words, even to the extent a federal court ap-
pears to characterize power as incidental, it still will not claim it un-
less it is one traditionally asserted by courts.' Thus, regardless of
whether one approaches procedural authority as a problem of in-
herent or incidental authority, it is necessary to determine whether
history supports the claim. 2 °
B. Historical Arguments for Inherent Procedural Authority
This Section investigates whether the historical record from the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries supports the claim
that the Constitution, either by outright grant or implication, au-
thorizes a federal court to articulate procedural rules in the context
of adjudication and in the absence of enabling legislation. To that
end, it canvasses the Framing and Ratification debates, the early
congressional record, contemporary treatises, and early federal
court opinions, all with a view to discerning whether informed ob-
servers during this period understood federal courts to possess in-
herent authority to regulate procedure. In keeping with the ten-
.. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
"' See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 124 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("As
with any inherent judicial power.., we should exercise [the Court's remedial powers]
in a manner consistent with our history and traditions."); Chambers v. NASCO, 501
U.S. 32, 58 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that once established, Article III
courts have "the authority to do what courts have traditionally done in order to ac-
complish their assigned tasks"); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252-57
(1891) (rejecting claim that federal courts possess inherent authority to order medical
exams of plaintiffs on the ground that such authority has never been claimed by
common law courts); see also Idleman, supra note 104, at 49 ("[T]he first criterion [in
evaluating a claim to inherent authority] is whether a given power is one that courts,
within the Anglo-American judicial tradition, have historically possessed."); Pushaw,
supra note 106, at 741 (contending that the arsenal of implied judicial powers is lim-
ited to those "rooted in historical Anglo-American practice").
20 To be sure, one might want to see stronger historical evidence before concluding
that power is implicitly contained within the grant of "the judicial Power" than one
would before concluding that a power is one traditionally exercised by courts. In
evaluating the historical evidence, Section III.C accounts for this.
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dency of the literature and cases, I will refer to the judiciary's sup-
posed power over procedure as "inherent," without distinguishing
between the distinct constitutional arguments that might support a
claim to such authority.
1. Framing and Ratification
The record of the debates surrounding the Constitution's draft-
ing and ratification neither directly refutes nor directly supports
the proposition that federal courts possess inherent authority to
make rules of procedure and evidence in the absence of enabling
legislation.' 2' At least two procedural issues surfaced repeatedly
during the debates. One was the fear that the Supreme Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction "both as to Law and Fact" would permit the
Court to retry cases on review, thereby undercutting the jury right
and requiring citizens to travel to the Court itself to litigate their
cases.1 22 The other was the concern that the Constitution, by not
explicitly requiring jury trials in civil cases, impliedly abolished
them." Particularly in the course of debating these two issues, al-
though occasionally in other contexts as well, participants in these
debates acknowledged the power of Congress to regulate federal
121 I reached this conclusion after reviewing The Records of the Federal Convention
of 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911), The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter Elliot's
Debates], The Federalist Papers, supra note 107, and The Complete Anti-Federalist
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
122 See, e.g., Thomas M'Kean, Speech in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
(Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 121, at 539-40 (defending provision);
James Wilson, Speech in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2
Elliot's Debates, supra note 121, at 518-19 (identifying issue as contentious); Edmund
Pendleton, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 18, 1788), in 3 Elliot's
Debates, supra note 121, at 519-20 (reflecting concern in Virginia legislature about
appellate review as to law and fact); Editorial, The Impartial Examiner, Va. Indep.
Exam'r (Richmond), Feb. 27, 1788 ("Or what is an appeal to enquire into facts after a
solemn adjudication in any court below, but a trial de novo?").
' See, e.g., The Federalist No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 107, at 495
(identifying this objection to the Constitution as the one "which has met with most
success in [New York], and perhaps in several of the other States"); The Impartial
Examiner, supra note 122 ("[C]onsider whether you will not be in danger of losing
this inestimable mode of trial in all those cases, wherein the constitution does not
provide for its security.").
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court procedure.124 The power of the federal judiciary to generate
procedures of its own, by contrast, was neither acknowledged nor
denied.125
124 For example, in addressing fears that the proposed Constitution abolished trial by
jury in civil cases, James Wilson assured the citizens of Philadelphia that "no danger
could possibly ensue," despite the Constitution's silence on the question, "since the
proceedings of the supreme court are to be regulated by the congress." James Wilson,
Speech on the Federal Constitution, Delivered in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in Pam-
phlets on the Constitution of the United States, Published During Its Discussion by
the People, 1787-1788, at 157 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888); see also Abraham
Holmes, Speech in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 30, 1788), in 2 El-
liot's Debates, supra note 121, at 111 (lamenting that the Constitution, in failing to
specify certain rules of procedure and evidence in criminal cases, left Congress virtu-
ally unchecked power to prescribe such rules); James Madison, Speech in the Virginia
Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), in 3 Elliot's Debates, supra note 121, at 534
(referring to Congress's power to "prescribe such a mode as will secure the privilege
of jury trial"); Patrick Henry, Speeches in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20,
1788; June 23, 1788), in 3 Elliot's Debates, supra note 121, at 544-45, 577-78 (assert-
ing that in civil cases, it would be up to Congress to decide whether a jury trial was
guaranteed); William Maclaine, Speech in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention
(July 29, 1788), in 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 121, at 175-76 (referring to Con-
gress's power to prescribe the mode of proceeding in inferior federal courts, including
the mode by which trial by jury in civil cases would be had); The Federalist No. 83
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 107, at 496 (asserting that Congress possessed "a
power to prescribe the mode of trial," and that consequently the constitutional silence
with respect to juries in civil cases left Congress "at liberty either to adopt that institu-
tion or to let it alone").
'2Professor Robert Pushaw has asserted that Edmund Pendleton made remarks
during the ratification debates reflecting the belief that federal courts possessed some
inherent authority over procedure. Pushaw, supra note 106, at 833 n.518. The basis for
this suggestion is Pendleton's observation that inferior courts would decide questions
regarding the admissibility of evidence and the competency of witnesses. See Edmund
Pendleton, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 18, 1788), in 3 Elliot's
Debates, supra note 121, at 519-20. In my judgment, these remarks do not bear on
any belief Pendleton may have had regarding the inherent procedural authority of
courts. Pendleton made these comments in the course of allaying fears that the Su-
preme Court's jurisdiction both "as to law and to fact" would permit the Supreme
Court to retry cases at the appellate level, thereby forcing citizens to travel, often
great distances, to litigate in the Supreme Court itself. See id. at 517-21. His assertion
that inferior courts would decide whether to admit evidence was intended to under-
score that inferior courts, rather than reviewing courts, made such determinations and
that this well-established division of authority, combined with Congress's power to
make exceptions and regulations to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, would
render "appeals, as to law and fact, proper, and perfectly inoffensive." ld. at 520.
Pendleton did not indicate what standards inferior courts would apply in making
these evidentiary determinations, and his remarks are as consistent with a belief that
inferior courts would make these evidentiary determinations according to the com-
mon law or legislation as they are with a belief that inferior courts would make these
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This recognition of congressional authority over procedure and
the lack of any corresponding recognition of judicial authority does
cut slightly against the conclusion that informed observers believed
the latter authority to exist. It is difficult, however, to make this in-
ference do too much work. To the extent that they focused on judi-
cial procedure at all, participants in these debates were largely ar-
guing about whether Congress would protect or undermine the
practice of employing juries in civil cases. This focus on Congress's
role in regulating procedure (or at least this aspect of it) reflects an
assumption that any uniform regulation in this regard would come
from Congress; it also reflects an assumption that Congress would
have the last word on at least this aspect of federal court proce-
dure. But it does not say much about the inherent power of the
federal courts to regulate the use of juries or any other procedural
device in the absence of congressional action. To be sure, the lack
of focus on the role of the federal courts in regulating procedure
likely reflects a belief that the federal courts would play an insig-
nificant role relative to Congress in regulating procedure-a belief
that has proven true over the succeeding two centuries. But belief
in an insignificant role does not translate to a belief in no role, nor
does it address the question of whether some small core of proce-
dural issues lies beyond congressional control.
On the whole, then, the debates surrounding the Constitution's
drafting and ratification are relatively unhelpful in determining
whether Article III courts possess inherent authority to regulate
litigation before them.
2. Early Judiciary and Process Acts
There were four pieces of legislation passed by the First and
Second Congresses that significantly affected the structure of the
federal judiciary and the procedures it followed: the Judiciary Act
of 1789,126 the Process Act of 1789,127 a 1792 amendment to the
Process Act,12 and a 1793 amendment to the Judiciary Act. 29 These
evidentiary determinations according to standards established pursuant to their own
inherent authority.
,26 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
217 Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93.
28 Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275.
29 Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 333.
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statutes provided numerous and detailed procedural regulations.
Most relevant for present purposes are two." Section 17 of the Ju-
diciary Act of 1789 provided that "all the said courts of the United
States shall have power... to make and establish all necessary
rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts. '31 Sec-
tion 2 of the Process Act of 1789 directed federal courts to follow
the modes of proceeding prescribed by the civil law in equity and
admiralty suits; in common law suits, federal courts were to follow,
inter alia, the "modes of process" used in the supreme court of the
state in which the federal court sat. 2 A 1792 replacement of the
Process Act and a 1793 amendment to the Judiciary and Process
Acts changed these statutes slightly but did not alter them in sub-
stance.33 Between them, the Judiciary and Process Acts provided a
30 In addition to the two provisions discussed in the text, there were numerous other
provisions that regulated federal court procedure. For just a few examples, see Judici-
ary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 15, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (granting all federal courts the power "to
require the parties to produce books or writings in their possession or power, which
contain [pertinent] evidence"); § 30, 1 Stat. at 88 (authorizing depositions "de bene
esse"); Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 1, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (providing that all writs and
process issuing from a federal court "shall be under the seal of the court from whence
they issue").
'3'Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
132 Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94. The phrase "modes of process"
could have been interpreted to oblige federal courts to mimic only the form of the
processes issuing from the court. From the start, however, federal courts interpreted
the Process Act to oblige them to mimic state courts not only in the form of the proc-
esses they issued but also in the procedures they employed. See Julius Goebel, Jr.,
Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, at 514, 575 (1971). In 1792, Congress amended
the Process Act to make this understanding explicit: the 1792 amendment to that Act
substituted the phrase "modes of proceeding" for the arguably narrower phrase
"modes of process." See Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
133The 1793 amendment to § 17 of the original Judiciary Act made the grant of
rulemaking authority more detailed, thereby arguably strengthening it. The amend-
ment granted federal courts the power
to make rules and orders for their respective courts directing the returning of
writs and processes, the filing of declarations and other pleadings, the taking of
rules, the entering and making up judgments by default, and other matters in
the vacation and otherwise in a manner not repugnant to the laws of the United
States, to regulate the practice of the said courts respectively, as shall be fit and
necessary for the advancement of justice.
Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 7, 2 Stat. 333, 335. The 1792 Process Act repealed the
Process Act of 1789, which had been temporary, and replaced it with a substantially
similar, but permanent, statute. The new act deleted the original Process Act's refer-
ence to the civil law and directed federal courts to follow the "principles, rules and
usages which belong to courts of equity and to courts of admiralty respectively," and
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fairly complete procedural system for courts in the United States,
at least in civil cases: federal courts were generally to observe the
procedure required by either state or civil law, and, if there were
procedural matters that state or civil law did not address, federal
courts could regulate them pursuant to the power granted in Sec-
tion 17 of the Judiciary Act. With respect to criminal cases, the law
regulating procedure was more open ended. While federal courts
construed Section 17(b) of the Judiciary Act as permitting rule-
making in both criminal and civil cases, they construed the Process
Act as inapplicable to criminal cases. Except in the relatively rare
instances in which Congress prescribed a specific criminal proce-
dure to the contrary," the federal courts followed common law
rules of criminal procedure, rather than the variations to those
rules made by any particular state.
The debate surrounding these provisions does not reveal any
discussion about whether, in the absence of this legislation, federal
courts would have possessed inherent authority to govern their
own procedure.136 For example, the enactment of the Process Act
it rendered all of the Act's instructions "subject however to such alterations and addi-
tions as the said courts respectively shall in their discretion deem expedient." Process
Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. It is not clear whether the latter proviso sim-
ply extended the scope of the federal courts' authority to adopt rules under § 17 or
whether it functions itself as a rulemaking grant.
," Professor Julius Goebel notes that the first Congress gave the federal courts
"only a few directions relating to [criminal] procedure"; he observes that the first fed-
eral criminal statute "was drawn on the assumption that common law methods of trial
would be followed." Goebel, supra note 132, at 609.
' The same was true with respect to rules of evidence in criminal cases. The Su-
preme Court construed the Rules of Decision Act as inapplicable to criminal cases,
and for over sixty years, federal courts observed common law rules of evidence rather
than modifications to the common law adopted by any particular state. See Barrett,
supra note 7, at 375 & n.197. In 1851, the Supreme Court changed this practice by
construing the Judiciary Act of 1789 as implicitly requiring, in criminal cases, adher-
ence to state evidence law, as that law existed on the date of the state's admission to
the Union. Id.
136 The first three volumes of the Annals of Congress cover the enactment of all four
of these statutes. A review of those volumes revealed no discussion about the inher-
ent authority of the federal courts (or lack thereof). Nor did the inherent authority (or
lack thereof) of federal courts over procedure appear to be a topic of debate among
informed onlookers of the time. See generally 4 The Documentary History of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, 1789-1800 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) [hereinafter
Documentary History] (collecting letters, diary and journal entries, newspaper items,
and notes of speeches and debates that cast light upon the enactment of the Judiciary
and Process Acts of 1789); Goebel, supra note 132, at 457-551 (describing history of
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apparently generated no discussion-or at least no recorded dis-
cussion-about what federal courts would have done in the ab-
sence of an instruction about the procedure they were to follow.
Similarly, the enactment of the rulemaking grant contained in Sec-
tion 17 of the Judiciary Act apparently generated no discussion as
to whether this provision affirmed a power -that otherwise existed
or whether it granted a new power that courts did not otherwise
possess. That said, it is worth observing that the other powers
granted by Section 17-the powers to grant new trials, administer
oaths or affirmations, and punish contempt-were powers that
Founding-era lawyers apparently treated as inherent in all courts.
37
The inclusion of procedural rulemaking on that list might be
thought evidence that power over procedure also falls in that cate-
gory. On the whole, though, the record regarding the adoption of
the Judiciary and Process Acts, like the record surrounding the
Constitution's drafting and ratification, reflects both a belief in ex-
tensive congressional authority and a lack of concern with any in-
herent judicial authority to adopt procedures in areas the legisla-
ture left open.'38
Judiciary and Process Acts of 1789). It must be acknowledged, however, that claiming
a negative here (that is, that the inherent power was not discussed) is complicated by
the fact that the records from this period, particularly of debates in the Senate, are not
complete. The Annals of Congress were reconstructed in the 1820s-40s based on con-
temporary newspaper accounts of coverage of the House. Because the Senate did not
allow reporters to observe its proceedings until February 20, 1794, the only records of
its proceedings in the first two Congresses and part of the third are the official journal
(which consists of roll calls and parliamentary entries) and individual Senators' notes.
Thus, as a general matter, the lack of discussion regarding inherent power in the
House during this period is more meaningful than the similar silence in the Senate.
117The contempt power was clearly treated as one inherent in all courts. See infra
note 158 and accompanying text. There is less evidence regarding the powers to grant
new trials and to administer oaths, but state cases offer reason to believe that both of
these powers were thought to be inherent as well. See infra note 169 (new trials); see
also Prentiss v. Gray, 4 H. & J. 192, 197 (Md. 1816) ("Courts of justice have essen-
tially, and as appertaining to their very nature, authority to administer oaths in all
cases of which they have jurisdiction."); Montgomery v. Snodgrass, 2 Yeates 230, 231-
32 (Pa. 1797) ("[W]e disclaim all affinity whatever to that [Board of Property]; they
are no court in any sense of the word; they are not vested with the powers essentially
necessary to such a tribunal; they can neither administer an oath, enforce the atten-
dance of witnesses, nor punish contempts ... ") (emphasis added).
'3' It is worth noting that the congressional record surrounding the adoption of the
Judiciary and Process Acts is silent with respect to more than just inherent judicial
authority over procedure. Legislators never discussed inherent judicial authority of
858
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Failed congressional proposals from this period reveal similarly
little about whether federal courts were perceived to possess inher-
ent authority-even authority generally subordinate to congres-
sional authority-over procedure. In the drafting of the Process
Act of 1789, the first Senate Judiciary Committee proposed a bill
aimed toward establishing a largely uniform procedure for the new
federal courts; the Process Act as ultimately enacted represented a
rejection of this proposal in favor of having each federal court fol-
low the procedure of the state in which it sat. 39 Roughly two years
later, on January 29, 1790, Congressman Smith of South Carolina
introduced a resolution to direct the Supreme Court to report to
the House "a'plan for regulating the Processes in the Federal
Courts, and the fees to the Clerks of the same." ' That resolution
was tabled and never discussed. In 1793, the House of Representa-
tives proposed an amendment to the rulemaking grant in the Judi-
ciary Act that would have withdrawn the grant of local rulemaking
authority to all federal courts and replaced it with an exclusive
grant of supervisory rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court. '
There was no discussion of inherent local authority surrounding ei-
ther the proposal or its rejection, even though one might expect to
see some discussion on the question of whether withdrawing the
local rulemaking authority of the federal courts infringed upon or
even entirely removed procedural authority they would otherwise
possess. In any event, the record of failed proposals, like that of
enacted legislation, ultimately reveals more about Congress's esti-
mation of its own authority than about its views on the authority of
the federal courts.
The single exception to this silence in the early congressional re-
cord lies in a report submitted to the House of Representatives on
any sort, including well-established inherent authority like the authority to punish
contempt of court.
"'See Goebel, supra note 132, at 510-37 (describing Judiciary Committee's pro-
posal to regulate federal procedure in detail and Senate's rejection of it). As the
struggle between those who favored uniform federal procedure and those who fa-
vored state procedure suggests, it was the interests of the states relative to the federal
government, rather than the interests of federal courts relative to Congress, that oc-
cupied legislative attention. Id. at 510-11, 539-40 (arguing that the legislative history
of the Process Act reveals a struggle between those who favored a consolidated na-
tional government and those who favored resting more control with the states).
1401 Annals of Cong. 1141-43 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
'' Goebel, supra note 132, at 549-51. The Senate rejected the proposal.
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December 31, 1790, by Edmund Randolph, then Attorney General
of the United States. 42 The House had commissioned Randolph to
identify and propose remedies for any deficiencies he perceived in
the federal judicial system.14 ' Randolph's response to the House, in
addition to addressing various other perceived weaknesses in the
Judiciary and Process Acts, proposed that Congress replace reli-
ance on the procedure of the various states with a uniform code of
federal procedure." He argued that Congress should grant the Su-
preme Court authority to prescribe supervisory rules binding
throughout the federal courts."5 In defending the propriety of such
a grant, Randolph wrote as follows: "Rules of practice belong to
the authority of every court, and their other incidental powers add
to that authority. The transition from these to the superintending
of the whole course of proceedings, will not therefore be consid-
ered as too great.' ' 16 The House did not consider the report after
receiving it."47
Randolph's report gives some small indication that the power to
develop rules of practice was one considered inherent in every
court. Randolph apparently believed, and assumed his audience to
believe, that every court possessed this power. In evaluating the
significance of Randolph's belief, it is worth noting that he had
been a member of the Constitutional Convention's Committee of
Detail; he had also presented the Virginia Resolutions to the Con-
stitutional Convention in his capacity as Virginia's then-governor.
Randolph was, therefore, a particularly well-informed observer of
the Constitution's drafting and implementation. Nonetheless, -the
fact that his is the sole suggestion of inherent procedural authority
appearing in the early congressional record renders it evidence of
limited weight.
142 Edmund Randolph, Report of the Attorney-General to the House of Represen-
tatives (Dec. 27, 1790), in 4 Documentary History, supra note 136, at 127-67.
141 Id. at 122.
'4 Id. at 151-53, 166.
,41 Id. at 151.
'4 Id. at 166.
141 Id. at 122.
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3. Treatises
At least two treatises reflecting the practice of the period ad-
dress, if only implicitly, the question whether power over proce-
dure is incident to every court. Tidd's Practice, a treatise on Eng-
lish practice widely consulted by the early American bench and
bar, implicitly affirms such power; '48 Story's Commentaries on the
Constitution implicitly denies it.9 The apparent conflict between
these two treatises, combined with the silence of so many other
treatises on the subject,15° renders the treatises of the period a rela-
tively unilluminating source of information for this study. A brief
discussion of the treatment of power over procedure in the works
of both William Tidd and Joseph Story follows below.
"" 1 William Tidd, The Practice of the Court of King's Bench in Personal Actions, at
xi-xii (London, E. Brooke et al., 2d ed. 1799). The first edition of Tidd's treatise was
published in two parts, with the first part appearing in 1790 and the second in 1794.
The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography observes that "[f]or a long period it was
almost the sole authority for common-law practice, going through nine editions by
1828.... The 'work was also extensively used in America, where one edition with
notes by Asa I. Fish appeared as late as 1856." E.I. Carlyle & Jonathan Harris, Tidd,
William, in 54 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 763 (H.C.G. Matthew &
Brian Harrison eds., 2004).
493 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1752
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Company 1833).
"'
50 In addition to Tidd's Practice and Story's Commentaries, I reviewed the following
treatises, all of which were silent on the question whether federal courts possess in-
herent authority to regulate procedure: Alfred Conkling, A Treatise on the Organiza-
tion, Jurisdiction and Practice of the Courts of the United States (Albany, Win. & A.
Gould & Co. 1831); 6 Nathan Dane, A General Abridgment and Digest of American
Law (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1823); Peter S. Du Ponceau, A Dissertation
on the Nature and Extent of the Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States
(Phila., Abraham Small 1824); David Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study (Balt., Coale
& Maxwell 1817); 1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law (N.Y., 0. Halsted
1826); Thomas Sergeant, Constitutional Law (Phila., P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson, 2d
ed. 1830); 1 Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of Reference to the Constitution
and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States; and of the Common-
wealth of Virginia (St. George Tucker ed., Phila., William Young Birch & Abraham
Small 1803); 1 James Wilson, The Works of the Honourable James Wilson (Phila.,
Lorenzo Press 1804). I also consulted the following secondary sources: Goebel, supra
note 132; 2 George Lee Haskins & Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John
Marshall, 1801-15 (1981); Robert Wyness Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in
Historical Perspective (1952); William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common
Law, 1760-1830 (1975); Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, Federal Courts in the Early Re-
public: Kentucky 1789-1816 (1978); 3-4 G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and
Cultural Change, 1815-35 (1988).
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Tidd's Practice does not explicitly address the question whether
authority to regulate procedure inheres in every court. In discuss-
ing the sources of procedural rules, however, Tidd strongly implies
that such authority exists. In the introduction to his lengthy sum-
mary of the procedures controlling various suits in the Courts of
King's Bench and Common Pleas, Tidd identifies the sources of
procedural regulation. Throughout, he emphasizes that the courts
themselves, through both orders and judicial decisions, are an im-
portant source of procedural regulation. For example, Tidd writes:
"The practice of the court, by which the proceedings in an action
are governed, is founded on ancient and immemorial usage, regu-
lated from time to time by rules and orders, acts of parliament, and
judicial decisions.''. To be sure, Tidd does not explicitly identify
the inherent authority of the court as the justification for the rules
and judicial decisions that regulate the practice in each court. Be-
cause, however, Parliament did not confer general rulemaking au-
thority upon English courts until 1833, courts regulating procedure
before then necessarily did so on their own authority rather than in
reliance on legislative warrant12
Joseph Story's renowned Commentaries can be read as taking a
contrary view on the question, and, as an American treatise, it is
entitled to more weight. Story writes as follows:
151 1 Tidd, supra note 148, at xi; see also id. at xii ("[A]s questions arise respecting
the regularity of the proceedings, the courts are called upon to settle, by judicial deci-
sions, the course of their own practice, or to fix the construction of the rules or acts of
parliament which have been made respecting it.").
152 The Civil Procedure Act of 1833 contained the first parliamentary grant of rule-
making power to judges. R.J. Walker & M.G. Walker, The English Legal System 26
(2d ed. 1970). Walker and Walker note that "[b]efore the nineteenth century each
court regulated its own internal procedure with very little intervention by Parlia-
ment." Id. at 60. See also Millar, supra note 150, at 27 (asserting that English proce-
dure historically derived from the courts rather than from any legislative source);
Samuel Rosenbaum, The Rule-Making Authority in the English Supreme Court 4 &
n.8 (1917) (describing English civil procedure as entirely judge-made until the Civil
Procedure Act of 1833). The same, incidentally, is true of English criminal procedure,
which judges developcd with very little parliamcntary oversight until the mid-
nineteenth century. See David Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Ninetcenth
Century 1, 19, 22, 297 (1998) (noting that the "overwhelming majority" of criminal
defendants were tried summarily and that procedure upon such prosecutions was
wholly at the magistrate's discretion until at least 1848); Patrick Devlin, The Criminal
Prosecution in England 11-13, 28, 38, 42-45 (1958) (describing English criminal pro-
cedure as developed entirely at the instigation of courts themselves).
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[I]n all cases, where the judicial power of the United States is to
be exercised, it is for congress alone to furnish the rules of pro-
ceeding, to direct the process, to declare the nature and effect of
the process, and the mode, in which the judgments, consequent
thereon, shall be executed.
53
Insofar as Story describes power over procedure as belonging to
"congress alone," this passage denies that any other body, includ-
ing federal courts, shares in that power. The conclusion that Story
viewed authority over procedure as exclusively legislative is rein-
forced by a later passage in which Story acknowledges the inherent
authority of the federal courts but does not explicitly include
power over procedure on the list. He writes:
[W]hile the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is al-
most wholly under the control of the regulating power of con-
gress, there are certain incidental powers, which are supposed to
attach to them, in common with all other courts, when duly or-
ganized, without any positive enactment of the legislature. Such
are the power of the courts over their own officers, and the
power to protect them and their members from being disturbed
in the exercise of their functions.
Story's description of inherent powers is consistent with that
found in the cases described below: it emphasizes the court's inher-
ent ability to control those who serve it and to punish behavior dis-
ruptive to the judicial process. To be sure, the use of the phrase
"such are" indicates that the list is not exhaustive; further, there is
reason to believe, based on Story's judicial opinions, that he be-
lieved that the common law vested courts with some procedural
powers not conferred by statute.?5 Even if, however, Story's Com-
mentaries do not entirely foreclose the notion that Story perceived
courts to possess inherent authority to regulate procedure, the
treatise surely casts significant doubt upon it.
153 3 Story, supra note 149, § 1752 (emphasis added).
"4 Id. § 1768; see also Sergeant, supra note 150, at 29 (similarly identifying a court's
power over its own officers and its power to punish contempt as incidental powers,
and similarly failing to include power over procedure on the list).
155 See, e.g., Sears v. United States, 21 F. Cas. 938, 938-39 (Story, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 12,592) (relying on common law to establish the authority of
the court to amend a variance).
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4. Cases
As described in the preceding Sections, the question of whether
federal courts possess inherent procedural authority apparently did
not occupy either treatise writers or those who debated the Consti-
tution and the legislative output of the first and second Congresses.
One might expect this question to have occupied those it most con-
cerned: the federal courts themselves. To discern whether early
federal courts believed themselves to possess inherent procedural
authority, I surveyed all Supreme Court, circuit court, and district
court cases from the period between 1789 and 1820 that dealt with
either the concept of inherent authority or any matter of proce-
dure, which I defined as including civil procedure, criminal proce-
dure, and evidence. 15 6 This Section describes the results of this re-
search.
It is clear, both in the arguments of counsel and the reports of
early judicial opinions, that federal courts and the lawyers who
practiced before them believed federal courts to possess certain in-
herent powers."' Unfortunately, however, federal courts and coun-
sel only rarely addressed the question of whether courts possessed
inherent authority over procedure. A review of federal cases de-
1561 employed the following method of gathering the relevant cases. My research
assistant culled all the cases from the Federal Cases reporter that satisfied the criteria;
I did the same for the Supreme Court reporter. We then categorized the cases into the
following categories: admiralty, equity, civil procedure, criminal procedure, and evi-
dence. I read all of the cases in each of these categories to determine how the early
federal courts treated the regulation of procedure, particularly in the absence of legis-
lative guidance. In addition to reading the cases reported in the Supreme Court re-
porter, I also reviewed The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 1789-1800, an eight-volume set collecting documents regarding the business of
the Supreme Court, as well as its justices riding circuit, in that period. 1 Documentary
History, supra note 136, at xli-xlii.157 See, e,g., Forrest v. Hanson, 9 F. Cas. 455, 455 (C.C.D.C. 1801) (No. 4942) (sug-
gesting that the powers of courts can derive from either statutes or from "principle[s]
of the common law, extending, generally, to all judicial bodies"). Of course, early fed-
eral courts did not only address the authority they claimed. They also addressed an
inherent authority they ultimately-and famously-disclaimed: inherent jurisdictional
authority. See, e.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34
(1812) (denying that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction is within the powers implied
in all courts "from the nature of their institution"); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807) (denying that the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus is
inherent in every court). Contra id. at 79-80 (argument of counsel) (asserting that
federal courts do possess inherent authority to issue writs of habeas corpus).
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cided between 1789 and 1820 reveals that in large part, early dis-
cussions of inherent authority track their modern counterparts:
then, as now, most explicit discussions of inherent authority occur
in the contexts of contempt, "' regulation of the bar,' and regula-
tion of jurors.'" Explicit discussions of inherent authority over pro-
cedure occur in only a handful of older cases.
In theory, analyzing whether early federal courts believed them-
selves to possess inherent authority over procedure need not de-
pend only on whether they explicitly embraced or disclaimed it.
Regardless of what federal courts said about inherent authority
over procedure, one ought to be able to glean information by
studying what they did. If federal courts adopted procedural rules
in the course of adjudication and in the absence of statutory au-
thorization, that would be circumstantial evidence that federal
courts believed themselves to possess inherent authority over pro-
158 See, e.g., Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34; United States v. Duane, 25 F. Cas.
920, 922 (C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (No. 14,997) (claiming that, in holding defendant in con-
tempt, "[w]e confine ourselves within the ancient limits of the law, recently retraced
by legislative provisions and judicial decisions"); Hollingsworth v. Duane, 12 F. Cas.
359, 363-64 (C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (No. 6616) (argument of counsel). State courts similarly
asserted inherent authority to punish contempt. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 3 S.C.L. (1
Brev.) 155, 158 (S.C. 1802) (per curiam) ("Justices of peace have a power derived
from the common law, and necessarily attached to their offices, of committing and
confining for gross misbehaviour in their presence .... ).
"' See, e.g., King of Spain v. Oliver, 14 F. Cas. 577, 578 (C.C.D. Pa. 1810) (No. 7814)
(characterizing the right to inquire by what authority an attorney acted on his pur-
ported client's behalf as one "inherent in all courts," but acknowledging that this in-
herent power "may be taken away, or qualified by express statute; or additional cau-
tions may be superadded"). State courts similarly asserted authority over court
personnel. See, e.g., Yates v. New York, 6 Johns. 337, 372-73 (N.Y. 1810) (argument
of counsel) (asserting that courts, including chancery courts, possess inherent author-
ity to direct and control court officers, including clerks, in the discharge of their func-
tions); Mockey v. Grey, 2 Johns. 192, 192 (N.Y. 1807) ("The power of appointing a
guardian, ad litem, is incident to every court .... ").
160 See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (explaining
that "the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from
giving any verdict" when justice requires it); United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622,
623 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 14,858) (asserting the power to
withdraw a juror if, while a party is on trial before a jury, something occurs that "will
occasion a total failure of justice if the trial proceed"); Offutt v. Parrott, 18 F. Cas.
606, 607 (C.C.D.C. 1803) (No. 10,453) (fining jurors who escaped from the jury room
out the window). State courts asserted similar authority. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Bowden, 9 Mass. (9 Tyng) 494, 495 (1813) (recognizing inherent authority of a court
to withdraw a juror); Alexander v. Jameson, 5 Binn. 238, 242-43 (Pa. 1812) (asserting
inherent authority of a court to regulate what jurors take into the jury room).
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cedure. Conversely, if they did not adopt procedural rules without
statutory authorization, that would be circumstantial evidence that
federal courts did not believe that any such authority existed. Be-
cause there is a multitude of cases between 1789 and 1820 in which
federal courts advanced procedural rules without referencing any
statutory authority, the body of relevant case law at first impres-
sion offers substantial support for the proposition that early federal
courts believed themselves to possess inherent procedural author-
ity.
In fact, however, this body of case law sheds very little light on
the question of inherent authority because the study of it is compli-
cated by two factors. First, "common law" in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries had a different meaning than does
"common law" today. Today, we understand common law as law
created by judges. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies, however, lawyers and judges did not conceive of common
law as something judges fashioned; for the most part, they under-
stood it as something judges applied. As I have discussed in detail
elsewhere, federal procedural common law, like most common law,
was understood to apply in federal courts of its own force unless
Congress prescribed a different rule.16' Thus, Alfred Conkling, in
his 1831 treatise on the federal courts, could decline to discuss fed-
eral cases related to the execution of judgments on the ground that
"they are only declarative of the general common law principles
recognized in all courts of common law jurisdiction, or of the laws
of the respective states.' 62 Similarly, St. George Tucker, in his
American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, could instruct
16' See Barrett, supra note 7, at 376-84.
1
62 Conkling, supra note 150, at 317; accord id. at 233 (explaining that his treatise
would not detail the formal parts of the declaration because "[t]he common rules of
pleading, except where they have been changed by the laws of the states or by rules of
court are in general strictly applicable to proceedings in the national courts," and the
rules of common law pleading are adequately explained in other treatises). Professor
Mary Tachau's study of the Kentucky federal courts from 1789-1816 led her to con-
clude that "It]he most distinctive aspect" of the procedures observed by Kentucky
federal courts in this period "was their rigorous adherence to the antiquated techni-
calities of English law." Tachau, supra note 150, at 77. Throughout, Tachau details
examples of this phenomenon. See, e.g., id. at 84 (relating district judge's admonish-
ment that "It]he Latitude contended for by Mr. Attorney goes at once to destroy that
System of Good pleading which has stood the test for Ages past and which I hope will
continue to be strictly attended to by Judges").
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that the "maxims and rules of proceeding[s] [of the English com-
mon law] are to be adhered to, whenever the written law is si-
lent.''163 Early nineteenth-century cases from the Supreme, circuit,
and district courts reflect the same understanding."M Cases, there-
fore, in which courts articulate procedural rules in the absence of
statutory authorization or direction cannot necessarily be inter-
preted as assertions of inherent judicial authority. One must care-
fully discern whether, in any given case, the court perceived itself
to be exercising discretion or simply applying a settled common
rule.
The second and more serious factor complicating an effort to de-
termine whether early federal courts implicitly asserted inherent
authority over procedure is that they possessed broad, statutorily
granted authority over procedure. Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 gave each federal court the authority "to make and estab-
lish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the
said courts." '65 Despite that provision's reference to "rules," the
Supreme Court interpreted it to permit the regulation of procedure
163 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, supra note 150, app. at 429; see also 1 Kent, supra
note 150, at 320 ("If congress should by law authorize the district or circuit courts to
take cognizance of attempts to bribe an officer of the government.., and should
make no further provision, the courts would, of course, in the description, definition,
prosecution, and punishment of the offence, be bound to follow those general princi-
ples and usages, which are not repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United
States, and which constitute the common law of the land, and form the basis of all
American jurisprudence.").
1"4 See, e.g., Tatum v. Lofton, 23 F. Cas. 723, 723-24 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1812) (No.
13,766) (treating common law as controlling the question of whether a witness who
voluntarily gained an interest in litigation can rely on that interest as grounds for re-
fusing to testify); Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 664-65 (Marshall, Circuit
Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8411) (asserting that the common law, including pro-
cedural common law, applies in federal courts unless Congress says otherwise);
United States v. Johns, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 412, 414, 26 F. Cas. 616, 617 (Washington, Cir-
cuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 15,481) (holding that in the absence of contrary in-
struction from Congress, the number of peremptory challenges permitted in a capital
case was a matter governed by the common law, which permitted thirty-five); Owens
v. Adams, 18 F. Cas. 926, 926 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1803) (No. 10,633)
(holding that in the absence of any legislative provision, "the rules of the common
law" controlled questions regarding the admissibility of evidence, despite the court's
disagreement with the application of the rule in this instance).
165 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
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through either formal court rules or case-by-case adjudication."6
This interpretation of Section 17 means that one cannot identify
exercises of inherent authority simply by identifying cases that
avoid the first complication-in other words, by identifying cases in
which courts are advancing their own procedural rules rather than
applying settled common law principles. Because such cases could
as easily represent an exercise of the court's statutory authority as
its inherent authority, it is only possible to distinguish one from the
other if the deciding court does, and courts rarely did so. Most of
the time, courts simply adopted rules in the course of adjudication
without addressing the issue of their power at all.1 67 Other times,
they explicitly proclaimed themselves to possess power to regulate
"" In Fullerton v. Bank of the United States, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge
to establishing rules through adjudication. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 604, 613-15 (1828). It
noted:
Written rules are unquestionably to be preferred, because their commence-
ment, and their action, and their meaning, are most conveniently determined;
but what want of certainty can there be, where a Court by long acquiescence
has established it to be the law of that Court, that the state practice shall be
their practice ....
Id. at 613; accord Duncan's Heirs v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 435, 451 (1833)
("It is not essential that any court in establishing or changing its practice should do so
by the adoption of written rules. Its practice may be established by a uniform mode of
proceeding, for a series of years .... "). Although neither Fullerton nor Duncan's
Heirs explicitly invoked § 17 of the Judiciary Act in holding that court rules can be
established by the common law method, it seems fairly clear in context that the Court
was referring to that provision. Even if it was not, however, its failure to draw a sharp
distinction in these cases between procedural regulation by court rule and procedural
regulation by adjudication makes it less likely that federal courts drew such a distinc-
tion for purposes of § 17. See, e.g., Arnold v. Jones, 1 F. Cas. 1180, 1180 (D.S.C. 1798)
(No. 559) (explicitly invoking § 17 power to establish a rule, in the course of adjudi-
cating a case, that a motion for a new trial does not suspend judgment after a verdict).
167 See, e.g., Sulivan v. Browne, 23 F. Cas. 348, 348-49 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No.
13,593) (referring both to a previously established "rule of this court" and to an inno-
vation to that rule allowed in the present case, without any reference to the court's
authority to adopt either the initial rule or its temporary suspension); United States v.
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 77 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693) (es-
tablishing both the questions to be asked and the grounds to be accepted in determin-
ing whether to excuse jurors for cause); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38, 40-41
(Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692e) (laying down a rule with
respect to the questioning of witnesses); United States v. Stewart, 27 F. Cas. 1338,
1339 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,401) (adopting "a rule in this case, and in all other
cases of a similar nature" regarding the time allowed criminal defendants to secure
the presence of witnesses for trial); Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1039, 1040
(S.D.N.Y. 1820) (No. 13,956) (laying down rules regarding affidavits in certain patent
cases).
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procedure but did not identify the source of that power-leaving
open the question of whether they perceived it to be constitution-
ally or statutorily granted." It is not, then, that the early case law is
silent with respect to federal court authority over procedure. To
the contrary, there are hundreds of cases in which federal courts
explicitly or implicitly assert such authority. But the cumulative ef-
fect of the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of Section 17 and
the courts' general failure to identify whether or not they were re-
lying on Section 17 in adopting any particular rule renders the
lion's share of these cases useless for purposes of this study. In
most, it is impossible to tell whether courts regulating procedure
were asserting constitutional or statutory authority.
1 69
'6See, e.g., Patton v. Blackwell, 18 F. Cas. 1336, 1336 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1809) (No.
10,831) (adopting a rule regarding the imposition of costs in the event of continuance
and asserting, without citation, that "[t]his court has the power to establish such rules
of practice"); Anonymous, 1 F. Cas. 993, 993 (C.C.D. Conn. 1809) (No. 434) (asserting
that "this court was perfectly free to establish a better practice" than the English prac-
tice regarding particular affidavits but not identifying the source from which this free-
dom derived).
169 The courts' failure to distinguish between inherent authority and statutory au-
thority derived from the Judiciary Act causes confusion about the source of several
procedural powers. For example, there is evidence that early federal courts believed
themselves to possess inherent authority to permit amendments to pleadings. See
Sears v. United States, 21 F. Cas. 938, 939 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1812)
(No. 12,592) (relying on common law to establish the authority of the court to amend
a variance); Calloway v. Dobson, 4 F. Cas. 1082, 1083 (Marshall, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 2325) (asserting that courts possessed power, both at equity
and at common law, to permit amendments of pleadings). But because § 32 of the Ju-
diciary Act gave federal courts statutory authority to do so and because the courts
rarely identified the source of their authority, one cannot treat bare amendments as
assertions of inherent, as opposed to statutorily granted, authority. See, e.g., Smith v.
Barker, 22 F. Cas. 454, 455-56 (C.C.D. Conn. 1809) (No. 13,013) (asserting discretion
of the court to permit the plaintiff to amend at any time before the case is actually
committed to the jury); Wigfield v. Dyer, 29 F. Cas. 1156, 1156 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No.
17,622) (adopting a rule with respect to conditions upon amendment). Another ex-
ample is the power of the court to grant new trials. One can make a good case that
early courts believed themselves to possess inherent authority to grant new trials. See,
e.g., Bird v. Bird, 2 Root 411, 413 (Conn. 1796) (asserting that "it is incident to every
court, who are authorized to try causes by a jury, to set aside their verdicts for just
cause"); Inhabitants of Durham v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 4 Me. 140, 142 (1826) (ar-
gument of counsel) (asserting "the inherent power of this court to grant new trials at
common law"); Charles Edwards, The Juryman's Guide Throughout the State of New
York 184 (N.Y., 0. Halsted 1831) ("Perhaps the power to grant new trials, for certain
just causes ... is necessarily incident to every court that has power to try."); see also
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (authorizing federal courts to grant
new trials "for reasons for which new trials have usually been granted in the courts of
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Given the way that both the court's understanding of procedural
common law and the procedural grant in Section 17 cloud the evi-
dence, an assessment of the attitudes of the pre-1820 bench and bar
to the question of inherent authority over procedure can fairly rely
only upon the following kinds of cases: (a) cases that explicitly dis-
cuss inherent procedural authority; (b) cases that do not address
the concept of "inherent authority" in those terms but nonetheless
explicitly address the claim that courts possess a non-statutorily de-
rived authority over procedure; and (c) cases that neither directly
nor indirectly address the question of inherent authority but in
which federal courts assert a procedural power not granted by Sec-
tion 17 or any other provision in the early Judiciary and Process
Acts (for example, the power to grant a continuance). These re-
strictions dramatically narrow the pool of relevant evidence.
a. Cases that Explicitly Discuss Inherent Authority over Procedure
Chisholm v. Georgia is the only federal case that directly ad-
dresses the question of whether a federal court possesses the in-
herent authority to prescribe modes of process in the absence of
controlling legislation. In Chisholm, federal statutes were silent
with respect to three important procedural matters: the mode of
executing a judgment against a state, the mode of serving process
on a state, and the steps for compelling an appearance by the
state.170 Attorney General Edmund Randolph argued that, in the
absence of statutory prescription, the Supreme Court possessed in-
herent authority to regulate its process in all three respects.'71 With
respect to writs of execution, Randolph asked, "[W]hy may not ex-
ecutions even spring from the will of the Supreme Court, as [writs
law"). But because § 17 of the Judiciary Act gave federal courts statutory authority to
do so and courts rarely identified the source of their authority, grants of new trials
cannot be treated as assertions of inherent authority. See, e.g., Kohne v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 14 F. Cas. 838, 838-39 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 7921)
(claiming authority to grant a new trial without identifying its source). Thus, while
many cases dealing with amendments and new trials appear at first blush to be asser-
tions of inherent authority, the existence of statutory grants destabilizes that conclu-
sion.
170Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,420 (1793) (argument of counsel).
Id. at 426-29. Randolph's arguments in this regard were not met by opposing
counsel, as Georgia's lawyers had, per her instructions, declined to argue the case. Id.
at 419.
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enforcing judgments] were originally the creation of Courts?"'72
Drawing an analogy to the courts' inherent power to punish con-
tempt, he asserted that the "incidental authority" to formulate a
writ of execution "is not of a higher tone than that of fine and im-
prisonment, which belongs to every Court of record, without a par-
ticular grant of it."'73 Randolph made a similar argument with re-
spect to the Supreme Court's authority to devise a mode for
serving process and the steps for compelling an appearance: "if it
be not otherwise prescribed by law, or long usage, [the mode] is in
the discretion of the Court. . In other words, Randolph made
a claim similar to the one advanced by both the Supreme Court
and scholars today: federal courts possess inherent authority to fill
gaps left open in otherwise controlling procedural law. The differ-
ence between Randolph's claim and the modern one lies only in
the fact that Randolph treats procedural common law, rather than
enacted law alone, as a source of law deemed controlling.
The Chisholm majority did not explicitly address Randolph's ar-
gument regarding its inherent authority. But insofar as the Court's
order in the case provided both a method of serving process and
steps for compelling an appearance, the majority appeared to ac-
cept it implicitly.'75 It accepted that argument, moreover, over the
lone dissent of Justice Iredell, who protested that the authority to
devise modes of proceeding is "not one of those necessarily inci-
dent to all Courts merely as such, '7 6 and that courts receive "all
their authority, as to the manner of their proceeding, from the Leg-
172 Id. at 427.
173 Id.
114 Id. at 428 (describing the Court's authority to devise service of process); see also
id. at 429 ("As to the steps, proper for compelling an appearance; these too, not being
dictated by law, are in the breast of the Court.").
"' Id. at 480. In contrast to the Court's approach to service of process and the steps
for compelling an appearance, the Court's view with respect to its inherent authority
to issue a writ of execution is unclear. With respect to the latter, Randolph's claim of
inherent authority was made in the alternative. Id. at 426. His primary argument was
that the Judiciary Act of 1789 implicitly clothed the Supreme Court with the authority
to issue such a writ. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court's issuance of a writ of execution
cannot be taken as an implicit endorsement of the proposition that the Court thought
itself to possess inherent authority to do it.
76 Id. at 433 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
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islature only."' His belief in exclusive legislative control was so
firm, in fact, that he argued that judges simply could not exercise
judicial power in the absence of legislative direction regarding the
procedures to be observed."8 Once Chisholm was decided, echoes
of Justice Iredell's argument appeared in the press."9
Chisholm thus provides some evidence that informed observers
in the Founding era believed federal courts to possess inherent au-
thority over procedure. At the same time, Justice Iredell's dissent
provides some evidence that this view was not universally held.Y
And while Chisholm's explicit discussions of inherent authority
separate it from other cases of the period in which rules were made
and authority unaddressed, it is the case even here that the exis-
tence of the Judiciary Act's Section 17 casts doubt on whether the
Court was relying on inherent rather than statutorily granted au-
thority."' It bears emphasis, however, that both Randolph's argu-
," Id. at 432. Interestingly, Justice Iredell grounded his argument in favor of exclu-
sive legislative control in the same constitutional provision relied upon by some mod-
ern proponents of exclusive legislative control: the Sweeping Clause. See infra note
197.
178 Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 432 (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("This appears to me to be one of
those cases, with many others, in which an article of the Constitution cannot be effec-
tuated without the intervention of the Legislative authority."). Justice Iredell's views
in Chisholm were presaged by the notes that he took while Oswald v. New York, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1792), a case between New York and a citizen of another state, was
pending before the Court. In reflecting on the case, Iredell denied that Article III
empowered the Court to devise "any new mode of proceeding" and emphasized that
the power to devise new modes of trial belonged entirely to Congress. James Iredell,
Observations on State Suability, in 5 Documentary History, supra note 136, at 76, 84-
85. Oswald v. New York was tried by jury before the Supreme Court, and no formal
opinion was issued in the case. Oswald v. New York, in 5 Documentary History, supra
note 136, at 57, 59-67 (describing background of the case).
179 See, e.g., Hampden, Indep. Chron. (Boston), July 25, 1793, reprinted in 5 Docu-
mentary History, supra note 136, at 399, 401 (heatedly arguing that the authority to
determine the mode of exercising the judicial power, including the mode of proceed-
ing, belongs exclusively to Congress); The True Federalist to Edmund Randolph,
Number V, Indep. Chron. (Boston), Mar. 20, 1794, reprinted in 5 Documentary His-
tory, supra note 136, 270-71 (making same argument).
8 It is worth noting that Justice Iredell himself was not entirely consistent in his
view about inherent procedural authority. In several cases, he granted continuances
even in the absence of statutory authorization to do so. See, e.g., Hurst v. Hurst, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 512, 512, 12 F. Cas. 1028, 1028 (Iredell, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1799)
(No. 6929); Symes v. Irvine, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 383, 384, 23 F. Cas. 591, 592 (Iredell, Cir-
cuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (No. 13,714).
" Consider that in at least two later original jurisdiction cases, the Court devised
forms of process and rules of proceeding in explicit reliance on statutory authority
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ment (at least with respect to the authority to devise steps for serv-
ing process and compelling an appearance) and Iredell's dissent fo-
cus exclusively on inherent authority. That fact makes it unlikely
that the majority, in siding with Randolph, thought that Section 17
settled the issue. It seems far more likely that the Court believed,
as Justice Johnson explicitly stated on circuit several years later,
that if Congress gave a court jurisdiction without prescribing any
procedure, "would it not follow that the court must itself adopt a
mode of proceeding adapted to the exigency of each case?" '182
It is significant that, even if the federal courts were vague with
respect to the question whether federal courts possess inherent au-
thority to regulate procedure, at least some state courts were not.
Because so many of the federal cases were practically useless, I ex-
panded my search to include state cases decided between 1789 and
1820.3 This search yielded few cases, but the ones it did yield were
clear on the question of inherent procedural authority. The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania repeatedly held that "[e]very court of
record has an inherent power to make rules for the transaction of
its business, provided such rules are not contradictory to the law of
the land."" The court emphasized the existence of this inherent
and with no reference to inherent authority. See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 284, 287-88 (1831) (relying only on statutory authority); Grayson v. Vir-
ginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320, 320 (1796) (relying on the Judiciary Act's § 14). But see
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 98 (1861) (explicitly asserting inherent
authority to devise process and rules of proceeding), overruled in other respects by
Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987).
182 Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, 10 F. Cas. 355, 362 (Johnson, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5420). He went on to argue that the power to issue a writ of
mandamus is a "mode of proceeding" rather than a distinct branch of jurisdiction, and
that the power therefore exists even in the absence of a statutory grant. Id. at 363.
'83 In contrast to the method I pursued with respect to the federal cases, see supra
note 156 and accompanying text, I did not read all of the relevant state cases decided
between 1789 and 1820. For this portion of the study, I instead relied on searches in
electronic databases.
1 Barry v. Randolph, 3 Binn. 277, 278 (Pa. 1810) (Tilghman, C.J.); accord Boas v.
Nagle, 3 Serg. & Rawle 250, 253 (Pa. 1817) (implicitly recognizing inherent power of
court to regulate its practice); Vanatta v. Anderson, 3 Binn. 417, 423 (Pa. 1811) (not-
ing that despite the absence of a legislative grant, "it is not denied that [the Courts of
Common Pleas] have power from the nature of their constitution, to make rules for
the regulation of their practice"); Boyd's Lessee v. Cowan, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 138, 140
(Pa. 1794) ("[T]he Court can alter the practice, and institute any rules in an action of
ejectment, which they may deem beneficial, or for the furtherance of justice, without
legislative aid.").
Virginia Law Review
power, moreover, in the face of a Pennsylvania statute explicitly
granting it. It insisted that "[c]ourts possess[] these powers antece-
dently to any act of the legislature on the subject." '85 Indeed, the
court was quite clear that every court "necessarily possesse[s] the
incidental power of establishing rules for the regulation of its prac-
tice, independently of [a statutory grant]."'" The spotty case re-
porting in states other than Pennsylvania during this period makes
it difficult to discern whether other state courts espoused this be-
lief. Both the Court of Appeals of Kentucky and the Supreme
Court of New York, however, appear to have shared Pennsyl-
vania's sentiment.187
b. Cases that Assert Non-Statutorily Derived Authority over
Procedure
There are a few cases in which federal courts indirectly claimed
to possess inherent authority over procedure. In these cases, the
courts did not claim inherent authority per se; they instead claimed
that the common law vested courts with discretion to decide cer-
tain procedural matters. In United States v. Insurgents, no statute
governed how many persons should be summoned for a venire; the
circuit court held that the common law vested the court itself with
185 Barry, 3 Binn. at 279 (Yeates, J.).
'6 Dubois v. Turner, 4 Yeates 361, 362 (Pa. 1807) (Tilghman, C.J.).
187 See Kennedy's heirs v. Meredith, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 465, 466 (1814) ("[C]ourts may
adopt rules for the regulation of the practice upon points not provided for by
law .. "). Because I was unable to find any statutory grant of procedural authority
on the books at this time, 1 treat this statement as a reference to the court's inherent
authority rather than authority legislatively granted. See also Yates v. People, 6
Johns. 337, 372 (N.Y. 1810) (referring in dicta to "the general powers incident to
every court of record of regulating its own practice, and prescribing rules in regard to
the form of conducting its proceedings"). There is some evidence that the Virginia
courts established rules in the absence of legislative authority from 1784 to 1787. See
Pushaw, supra note 106, at 821 & n.461. There is also some evidence that colonial
courts exercised inherent authority over procedure. See Marilyn L. Geiger, The Ad-
ministration of Justice in Colonial Maryland, 1632-1689, at 14, 233 (1987) (noting that
Maryland colonial courts adopted their own procedures when the Assembly was si-
lent); Paul M. McCain, The County Court in North Carolina Before 1750, at 39 (1954)
("Without a law to specify a definite procedure for the county court the justices gen-
erally arranged matters to suit themselves and the people in attendance.").
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the discretion to choose the number.8 In Sears v. United States,
Justice Story, riding circuit, invoked the common law to establish
the authority of the court to amend a variance.' 9 And in Calloway
v. Dobson, Chief Justice Marshall, riding circuit, asserted that
courts possessed power, both at equity and at common law, to
permit amendments of pleadings." These cases are significant be-
cause in each, the court assumed itself to possess the powers tradi-
tionally possessed by common law courts.
c. Cases that Assert Procedural Power not Granted by the Judiciary
and Process Acts
Finally, there are a handful of cases in which federal courts failed
to invoke either inherent authority or the authority traditionally
possessed by common law courts, but nonetheless asserted the dis-
cretion to take actions not expressly authorized by statute. The
most prominent example is the right to grant continuances.' In
"2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 335, 341-42, 26 F. Cas. 499, 514 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 15,443);
see also United States v. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 DalU.) 515, 516, 9 F. Cas. 826, 918 (C.C.D. Pa.
1799) (No. 5126) (argument of counsel).
189 21 F. Cas. 938, 939 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 12,592). Sec-
tion 32 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized courts to amend a variance that was
merely a matter of form. Even if the variance at issue in Sears was within the purview
of § 32, the significant point for present purposes is that in establishing his authority
to act, Justice Story explicitly invoked the authority that the common law granted to
all courts of error rather than § 32.
"04 F. Cas. t082, 1083 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. t807) (No. 2325).
Again, § 32 of the Judiciary Act authorized the court to permit amendments to plead-
ing. The significant point for present purposes is that Justice Marshall did not rely on
the statutory grant but instead explicitly invoked the powers possessed by courts of
common law and equity.
191 See, e.g., King of Spain v. Oliver, 14 F. Cas. 571, 572 (Washington, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 7812) (denying continuance when party knew that witness was
about to depart and made no effort to procure his deposition); United States v. Frink,
25 F. Cas. 1220, 122l (C.C.D. Conn. 1810) (No. 15,171) (denying continuance for ab-
sent witness when the witness refused to attend); Hurst v. Hurst, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 52,
12 F. Cas. 1028 (Iredell, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. t799) (No. 6929) (granting con-
tinuance when the adverse party refused to answer a bill for discovery); Symes's Les-
see v. Irvine, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 383, 384, 23 F. Cas. 591, 592 (Iredell, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Pa. t797) (No. t3,714) (granting continuance when witness broke promise to a
party to attend the trial). There is some later authority from a state court explicitly
casting the right to grant or refuse a continuance as one "inherent in all courts." See
Wilson v. Phillips, 5 Ark. 183, 185 (1843); Burriss v. Wise & Hind, 2 Ark. 33, 41
(1839). It is worth noting that the federal courts briefly possessed a statutorily granted
power to grant continuances. Among other things, § t5 of the Judiciary Act of t801
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addition to granting continuances, federal courts did things like de-
lineating the kind of affidavits they would accept and allocating the
expenses associated with the attendance of witnesses." I found no
case in which a federal court addressed the source of its authority
to do any of these things, but because no statute empowered fed-
eral courts to take these procedural measures, those who did nec-
essarily acted on the belief that they possessed procedural powers
other than those statutorily granted.
C. Interpreting the Evidence
Federal courts can properly claim to possess an initiating author-
ity to adopt procedural rules if such authority is either conveyed as
part of "the judicial Power" itself or justified as a means supporting
the exercise of judicial power. In either event, the legitimacy of the
claim turns largely on historical practice. The former claim turns on
whether informed observers in the Founding era understood "the
judicial Power" to include authority to regulate procedure in the
course of adjudication. The latter turns on whether procedure is a
matter over which courts have historically exercised power.
As described in this Part, there is some historical support, albeit
far from overwhelming, for the argument that federal courts pos-
sess this initiating procedural authority. There is Edmund
Randolph's claim of inherent authority in his proposed bill regulat-
ing the business of the judicial branch, and there is the Supreme
Court's implicit acceptance of Randolph's argument regarding its
inherent authority in Chisholm. There are the clear assertions of
inherent procedural authority by state courts in Pennsylvania, Ken-
tucky, and New York. There is the explicit recognition by federal
courts of situations in which the common law vests all courts with
the discretion to take certain procedural steps related to the pro-
empowered federal courts "to grant continuances on the motion of either party." Ju-
diciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 15, 2 Stat. 89, 94. That Act was repealed in its entirety al-
most exactly one year later on March 8, 1802.
' See, e.g., Norwood v. Sutton, 18 F. Cas. 458, 458 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (No. 10,365)
(refusing to receive a supplemental affidavit on the ground that it was a practice lead-
ing to perjury); Ex parte Johnson, 13 F. Cas. 719, 719 (Washington, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Pa. 1803) (No. 7366) (requiring United States, rather than the defendant, to
pay for attendance of defense witness when the United States was the one to call
him).
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gress of a suit, and there are those cases in which the courts implic-
itly claim inherent authority by taking certain procedural steps in
the absence of enabling legislation. There are, in addition, few con-
tradictions of the proposition that federal courts possess inherent
procedural authority. Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm does cast
procedural regulation as the exclusive province of Congress, but
that dissent is, by definition, a minority view; it is also somewhat
inconsistent with Iredell's own practice on the bench. Story's
Commentaries does leave procedural authority off the list of inher-
ent judicial powers, but, at the same time, Story's own practice on
the bench is somewhat inconsistent with that belief.
It is worth specifically addressing how, if at all, the absence of
evidence, particularly in the cases, affects the historical analysis. If
lawyers and judges in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies believed courts to possess inherent procedural authority, one
would expect to find the most vigorous assertions of inherent pro-
cedural authority in the case law, but such assertions appear in only
a handful of federal cases. In the normal course, one might view
lack of case support as evidence on the other side of the ledger-in
other words, as evidence that federal courts were not widely per-
ceived to possess such authority. In this situation, however, the
evidence does not easily lend itself to that interpretation. Cases
abound in which federal courts assert authority over procedure.
The problem is not that procedural authority was never discussed,
but instead that the evidentiary value of such discussion is marred
by the existence of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act. Just as this am-
biguous evidence cannot be used to support a claim of inherent
procedural authority, neither can it be used to undercut it.
Thus, as matters stand, the historical record offers some support
for the proposition that federal courts possess inherent procedural
authority, but the support it offers is undeniably modest. It is so
modest, in fact, that if one were pursuing only the argument that
the Founding generation understood power over procedure to be
directly conferred by Article III, this evidence would probably not
be strong enough to support the conclusion that inherent proce-
dural authority exists. Reaching that conclusion presumably re-
quires evidence that "the judicial Power" was widely understood to
encompass power over procedure, and it is doubtful that this evi-
dence reflects widespread belief about the content of judicial
2008] 877
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power. But the historical evidence necessary to support a claim
that procedural authority is a legitimate instrumental power of
every federal court is surely less. This argument requires a showing
that the power asserted was one traditionally used, and the history
described in this Part seems to make that showing. Whatever gaps
exist in the historical record, it does show that the claim of judicial
power over procedure is not novel; it has historical antecedents.
Thus, even though the historical evidence falls short of establishing
that power over procedure directly vests in federal courts, it seems
sufficient to show that federal courts have long treated it as a
means legitimately employed toward the end of deciding cases.
This conclusion is strengthened by the persistence of the claim that
federal courts possess initiating authority over procedure. While
the claim of such procedural authority has never been as vigorous
or uniformly accepted as claims of inherent authority to punish
contempt and control court personnel, a consistent thread of cases
making this claim stretches from the Founding era to today.193
That said, even if the historical record supports the conclusion
that Article III implicitly grants federal courts power over proce-
dure, it is hard to argue that it compels that conclusion. The evi-
dence is weak enough that one could reject it as aberrational or at
least exceptional. One doing so, however, must be prepared to
treat judicial procedural authority as entirely derivative of Con-
gress's authority, existing only because Congress has not spoken to
an issue.194 This is not an untenable position, but it does take a far
more restrictive view of judicial authority than is characteristic of
any of the modern scholarship or case law. Indeed, the assumption
that federal courts possess inherent authority over procedure is so
deeply held that, as a practical matter, rolling it back likely requires
forceful evidence to the contrary. Such evidence does not exist
here. Thus, given that the historical record puts the modern claim
of inherent procedural authority on reasonably firm ground, and
given that the modern claim reflects a sensible approach to inter-
branch balance in matters of procedure, Article III is best con-
strued as implicitly granting federal courts procedural authority.
193 Subsection III.B.4 considered only those cases decided between 1789 and 1820.
For examples of later cases asserting inherent procedural authority, see supra notes
89-91 and accompanying text.
19 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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IV. COMMON LAW POWER AND INHERENT AUTHORITY
The preceding Parts explore two justifications for the ability of
federal courts to develop procedural common law in the absence of
congressional authorization. The first draws a straightforward
analogy to the power of the federal courts to make federal substan-
tive common law: when Congress fails to regulate federal court
procedure, an area that the Constitution impliedly commits to ex-
clusive federal control, federal courts may develop federal proce-
dural common law to fill the void. This argument treats judicial au-
thority over procedure, like judicial authority over substance, as
entirely derivative of and subservient to that of Congress. The sec-
ond justification offers a refinement: within this area committed to
exclusive federal control, Article III allocates some regulatory
power to federal courts by granting them an initiating authority to
regulate procedure through judicial decisions. This authority is not
exclusive; it must generally give way to contrary congressional
regulation. But it is something that a court possesses in its own
right rather than something that accrues to it merely by default.
The refinement offered by Article III is crucial to understanding
the procedural common lawmaking authority of the federal courts
because the existence of inherent procedural authority leaves open
the possibility that federal courts possess some core of procedural
authority that Congress cannot abrogate. At the same time, Article
III plays a limited role in the overall development of judicially
crafted procedural regulation, because the inherent procedural au-
thority conferred by Article III is limited. In accepting the exis-
tence of inherent procedural authority, it is important not to lose
sight of the constraints within which that authority operates.
First, it is necessary to dismiss a phantom constraint. Some
scholars and courts have claimed that another limit applies to the
inherent authority of federal courts: they have argued that federal
courts possess inherent authority, including inherent procedural
authority, only to the extent it is strictly necessary to the exercise of
judicial power.9 Such a limit, if applicable, would severely limit the
195 See, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 829 (1996) ("A court's inherent
power is limited by the necessity giving rise to its exercise."); Roadway Express v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) ("The inherent powers of federal courts are those
which 'are necessary to the exercise of all others."' (quoting United States v. Hudson
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ability of federal courts to fashion procedure in reliance on inher-
ent authority.'96 At least with respect to procedure, however, the
argument for a necessity limit does not hold. The strongest argu-
ment in favor of such a limit is a long line of cases, beginning with
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, in which federal courts have
described the exercise of inherent authority as limited by neces-
sity."9 In Hudson, the Court asserted:
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of
justice from the nature of their institution.... To fine for con-
tempt... inforce the observance of order, &c. are powers which
cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary
to the exercise of all others ... 198
Some treat Hudson and its progeny as imposing a necessity limit
on all exercises of inherent authority, including inherent proce-
dural authority.9 That, however, is an overreading of these cases,
all of which have arisen in the context of the courts' inherent
power to punish contempt and otherwise impose sanctions. Under-
stood in context, the "necessity" limit is designed to preserve a lim-
& Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812))); see also Pushaw, supra note 106, at
741-43, 847-49 (arguing that the judiciary possesses only those instrumental powers
that are strictly necessary to the exercise of judicial power, as opposed to those that
are merely useful to it); Van Alstyne, supra note 115, at 111 ("Neither the executive
nor the judiciary possess any powers not essential (as distinct from those that may be
merely helpful or appropriate) to the performance of its enumerated duties as an
original matter .... ).
See Pushaw, supra note 106, at 851 ("Any claim of 'necessity' [to exercise inher-
ent procedural authority] is further weakened by the fact that Congress has delegated
to judges a prominent role in drafting adjective laws."); see also Lear, supra note 35,
at 1160 ("Few modern forum non conveniens dismissals are necessary for the courts
to function.").
'7 Independent of Hudson and its progeny, Professor William Van Alstyne has ar-
gued that the Sweeping Clause gives Congress the exclusive power to give the execu-
tive and the judiciary those powers that are merely beneficial to the exercise of execu-
tive and judicial power, thereby limiting any implied powers possessed by the
judiciary and the executive to those that are indispensable. See Van Alstyne, supra
note 115. Professor Sara Sun Beale has persuasively refuted that argument. See Beale,
supra note 22, at 1471-72. In addition, the Supreme Court implicitly rejected a similar
argument made by the dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 432-33
(1793). See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
98 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (emphasis added); accord Degen, 517 U.S. at 829
(asserting that inherent power exists only to the extent necessary); Roadway Express,
447 U.S. at 764-65 (similar).
'99 See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 106.
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ited core of judicial authority from falling within the general prohi-
bition on adjudicating common law crimes, while at the same time
preventing a court's power to punish misbehavior from infringing
too far on Congress's exclusive power to define federal criminal ju-
risdiction. 2° In other words, the "necessity" limit provides a very
limited exception to the rule that only Congress can criminalize
conduct. While the Court has never expressly confined the "neces-
sity" limit to cases involving inherent judicial authority to punish
misbehavior, it has applied the limit in only that context.0" Of par-
2
"In distinguishing the Court's inherent power to punish contempt, an authority it
claimed, from the inherent authority to punish common law crimes, an authority it
disclaimed, the Court was not responding to an argument of counsel, as both the At-
torney General and counsel for the defendants declined to argue the case. Nonethe-
less, the indictment rendered against Hudson and Goodwin invited that distinction.
See Indictment, Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (denouncing defendants for "offend-
ing a contempt of the government of the United States against the Peace and dignity
of the United States and in violation of the laws thereof" (emphasis added)); see also
id. (denouncing defendants for inciting in citizens "hatred, contempt, and indignation
against the President of the United States and the Congress of the United States"
(emphasis added)). The Court's contempt power might have been thought to justify
federal jurisdiction over common law crimes on the rationale that if a federal court
can punish contempt without statutory authorization, so too can it punish other
crimes without statutory authorization. Conversely, a holding that a federal court
lacks power to punish common law crimes might have been thought to deny that it
possesses power to punish contempt. The "necessity" limit advanced by the Court
avoided either result.
201 See, e.g., Degen, 517 U.S. at 829 (holding that district court exceeded the limit of
necessity when it struck a defendant's pleadings in a civil forfeiture case on the
ground that he remained a fugitive in a related criminal case); Chambers v. NASCO,
501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991) (emphasizing necessity in the context of inherent power to
sanction misconduct); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S.
787, 821 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (recognizing, in the context of contempt, the
"narrow principle of necessity" that empowers each branch to protect itself); Road-
way Express, 447 U.S. at 766 (emphasizing necessity limit in context of recognizing
inherent authority of court to shift attorneys' fees as a sanction for misconduct); Ex
parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873) ("The power to punish for con-
tempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of
the courts...." (emphasis added)). The Court also invoked a necessity test in Ander-
son v. Dunn, where it recognized Congress's power to punish contempt. 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821) (holding that Congress could claim a "punishing power"
on the ground of self-preservation only if the power claimed is "the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed"). Because it deals with Congress, rather than
the courts, Anderson cannot be understood to distinguish contempt from the particu-
lar question of common law criminal jurisdiction. It is, however, analogous to Hudson
insofar as it sets narrow boundaries on the ability of any branch to impose criminal
sanctions without the cooperation of the other branches. Indeed, the special consid-
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ticular relevance for present purposes, it has never mentioned,
much less applied, the limit in the context of inherent procedural
authority, and the procedures it has approved as falling within that
authority go far beyond what is strictly necessary to the decision of
cases.2" To the extent that federal courts possess inherent proce-
dural authority, no necessity limit applies to it.
While inherent authority is not limited to those occasions on
which its exercise is absolutely necessary, it is nonetheless circum-
scribed. It must be recognized that inherent authority is local au-
thority, permitting each federal court to regulate only its own pro-
ceedings. Article III vests "the judicial Power" in each Article III
erations surrounding criminal punishment may well be what distinguish Anderson's
limited view of Congress's implied authority from McCulloch's expansive one.
"2 The Court has not invoked a necessity standard when describing the inherent au-
thority of a federal court to take docket-control measures. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones,
520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) ("The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings
as an incident to its power to control its own docket."); Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S.
248, 254 (1936) (asserting that district court has inherent power to stay proceedings
for the sake of "economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants");
Bowen v. Chase, 94 U.S. 812, 824 (1876) (describing power of courts to consolidate
cases "to prevent any practical inconvenience"). Nor has it invoked a necessity stan-
dard when describing its power to frame procedural rules in the course of adjudica-
tion. See, e.g., Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 146 (1985) (claiming that the courts of
appeals possess inherent authority to adopt "'procedures deemed desirable from the
viewpoint of sound judicial practice"' (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146
(1973)) (emphasis added)); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (claim-
ing that federal courts possess inherent authority to adopt procedures "'guided by
considerations of justice"' (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341
(1943))); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965) (describing federal courts' in-
herent procedural authority as "strong"); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383
(1933) (claiming that federal courts possess inherent authority to update common law
rules of evidence so as to make them more "useful"); In re Hien, 166 U.S. 432, 436
(1897) (explaining that "courts of justice possess the inherent power to make and
frame reasonable rules"); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 98 (1861) (ar-
guing that the Supreme Court "may regulate and mould the process it uses in such
manner as in its judgment will best promote the purposes of justice").
03 The Supreme Court has claimed to possess an inherent supervisory power to im-
pose procedures upon inferior federal courts. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) ("The law in this area is clear. This Court has supervisory au-
thority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority to prescribe rules of
evidence and procedure that are binding in those tribunals."). I have argued that this
claim is fundamentally flawed. See Barrett, supra note 7, at 325. The Court's designa-
tion as "supreme" likely functions as a limitation on Congress's power to design the
federal judiciary rather than as a grant of power to the Supreme Court. Id. at 361-65.
Moreover, even if it does function as a grant of power to the Court, there is no evi-
dence that power over inferior court procedure would be among the powers granted.
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court; thus, to the extent that the judicial power carries with it the
power to adopt procedures in the course of adjudicating cases, each
court possesses that power in its own right. A reviewing court can
set aside a rule on the ground that the inferior court abused its dis-
cretion in adopting it but not on the ground that it thought a differ-
ent rule a better one.2 ' Thus, Article III may well empower each
federal court to develop procedural common law governing the
proceedings before it, but it does not permit the Supreme Court to
prescribe a unified common law of procedure applicable through-
out the federal courts. The implications of this limitation can be il-
lustrated with reference to one of the well-known doctrines dis-
cussed in Part I. Were inherent procedural authority the only
justification for the authority of federal courts in this area, the Su-
preme Court could not purport to announce uniform rules of issue
and claim preclusion. The content of those doctrines-for example,
the decision whether to permit nonmutual issue preclusion-would
be left to the discretion of each court.
In fact, however, inherent procedural authority is not the only
justification for the authority of federal courts in this area. As Part
II explained, federal courts can exercise a common law authority
over procedure analogous to their common law authority over sub-
stance. In the realm of federal judicial procedure, as in the substan-
tive realms of constitutional preemption, federal courts can de-
velop uniform rules when Congress fails to do so. Inherent
procedural authority serves as a supplement to this broader com-
mon lawmaking authority. In addition to participating in the de-
velopment of a uniform procedural common law, each federal
court can exercise inherent authority to regulate its own proceed-
ings. The body of law resulting from these dual strands of authority
Id. at 366-84. The basis of any inherent procedural authority granted to the federal
courts is Article III's grant of judicial power, and, as explained in the accompanying
text, that power is granted to each court individually.
204 See Meador, supra note 114, at 1805 (explaining that the exercise of inherent au-
thority, "as with all matters of trial court discretion-is subject to appellate review for
abuse"); see also Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 463 U.S. 1323, 1324 (1983) (Rehnquist,
J., in chambers) ("Although recalling a mandate is an extraordinary remedy, I think it
probably lies within the inherent power of the Court of Appeals and is reviewable
only for abuse of discretion."); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824)
(holding that the inherent authority to regulate the bar resides in the discretion of
each court and the Supreme Court will consequently review disbarments only for an
abuse of discretion).
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is a collection of uniform doctrines largely drawn from general law
(much like the law of admiralty or interstate relations) and nar-
rower rules and discretionary measures associated with the inher-
ent authority of individual courts.
Each of these strands of procedural common law is evident in
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century cases described in Part
III. There were the common law doctrines of procedure, like pre-
clusion and abstention, which courts understood themselves to ap-
ply rather than make. 5 These doctrines were drawn from the gen-
eral law, which had an identifiable content of rules settled by
tradition or emergent consensus. Then there were the discretionary
rules, like those governing service of process in Chisholm, which
courts understood themselves to make in reliance upon inherent
authority.2" These rules addressed narrower questions that neither
the general nor enacted law governed. They were also invariably
local. All of the historical claims to inherent procedural authority
discussed in Part III treated that authority as a mechanism by
which a federal court regulated its own proceedings."
The same two strands of procedure are evident in the modern
cases. There are the descendants of the general common law rules,
like preclusion and abstention, which take the form of uniform
doctrine applicable throughout the federal courts."8 Then there are
the more discretionary procedural choices, like a rule governing
205 See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
"6 See supra notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
207 This evidence supports the proposition, explained above and defended elsewhere,
that the inherent authority conferred by Article III is local. See supra notes 203-04
and accompanying text. For further historical evidence in support of this proposition,
see Tidd, supra note 148, at xii ("[G]eneral rules are confined in their operation to the
court in which they are made .... Hence we find, that acts of parliament are fre-
quently necessary, to introduce regulations extending to all the courts .... ").
2'OModern abstention has its roots in a doctrine traditionally employed by courts of
equity. See supra note 27. Preclusion is a longstanding principle of general procedural
common law. See, e.g., Stevelie v. Read, 22 F. Cas. 1336, 1337 (Washington, Circuit
Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 13,389) ("The rule of law is clear, that a judgment is
inadmissible in evidence, except between the same parties, or those in privity with
them...."); Hurst v. McNeil, 12 F. Cas. 1039, 1041 (Washington, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 6936) (identifying rule of mutuality in preclusion as "a point
completely settled, and at rest").
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the time in which a case must be brought," that are best character-
ized as exercises of inherent procedural authority. It is worthy of
note that all of the procedures adopted by modern federal courts in
explicit reliance on inherent procedural authority address relatively
narrow questions governed by neither the general nor enacted
law."' These recent iterations of inherent authority differ from
their forebears only in the Supreme Court's occasional (and mis-
taken) deviance from the principle that inherent authority is lo-
cal.2
1 1
To be sure, these strands of procedural common law are some-
times intertwined. For example, forum non conveniens is often de-
scribed as an exercise of a federal court's inherent authority,212 and
insofar as it is an action that courts take related to the progress of a
suit, that characterization fits. On the other hand, the standards
that the Supreme Court has adopted to guide its exercise emerged
from a general consensus reached over time in the state courts,
lower federal courts, and scholarly community, 3 and in that re-
spect, forum non conveniens resembles the general procedural law
that courts applied throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies. The same is true of remittitur. A grant of remittitur appears
to be an exercise of inherent authority, but the rules governing the
exercise of that authority comprise a settled and uniform doc-
trine.1 Stare decisis similarly cuts across categories. 5 It is an old
and widely observed doctrine, which makes it resemble general
law; at the same time, it is not uniform. Stare decisis varies from
209 See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 n.29 (1972) (observing that a court
may rely on its inherent authority to "establish[] a fixed time period within which
cases must normally be brought").
210 See supra notes 89 (collecting examples of rules adopted in case law in reliance
on inherent authority), 91 (collecting examples of managerial measures courts may
take in reliance on inherent procedural authority).
211 See generally Barrett, supra note 7.
2 See supra note 35.
213 See supra note 32.
214 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
215 Compare Harrison, supra note 40, at 525-30 (treating stare decisis as general
law), with Lawson, supra note 40, at 212 (treating stare decisis as a doctrine developed
pursuant to inherent authority). It is the hybrid nature of stare decisis that makes
Congress's power over it a hard question. Were stare decisis only a doctrine of gen-
eral law, there could be little doubt about Congress's authority to abrogate it. It is the
relationship of stare decisis to the inherent authority of each court that makes the
question much harder.
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court to court, with each determining for itself the strength of its
precedent, 16 and this feature is more characteristic of inherent au-
thority.
The variety of this law renders it undeniably complex. Yet the
fact that its dual strands span the history of the federal courts re-
flects a longstanding if implicit judgment that there is value in dis-
tinguishing between the widely accepted procedures that every
federal court should observe and the discretionary choices that
each federal court has authority to make. In this regard, it is note-
worthy that even in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, tradi-
tion and consensus have mediated the growth of uniform federal
procedural common law. Doctrines like preclusion and abstention
do not resemble the traditional doctrines of general procedural
common law only in their content; they resemble the general law in
their development. To the extent that courts have changed these
doctrines, the changes have not been unilateral and abrupt depar-
tures from tradition. Rather, they have been responses to emerging
consensus about the need for a new approach. For example, in
abandoning the mutuality requirement for preclusion, the Supreme
Court followed the lead of state courts.217 Similarly, in introducing a
federal forum non conveniens doctrine, the Supreme Court im-
ported a doctrine that had become well rooted in state practice.1 8
This is not to say that either tradition or consensus invariably
guides the development of procedural common law. But it is to say
that much procedural common law reflects the same pattern that
Professor Caleb Nelson has observed with respect to substantive
common law: general law has persisted."9 Judges developing uni-
form procedural common law, like judges developing common law
in the substantive enclaves of constitutional preemption, do not, in
the main, develop rules through the raw exercise of discretion. In-
stead, they take account of the consensus reflected in secondary
sources and judicial opinions. To the extent that a court under-
stands itself to be exercising raw discretion, its action is better
216 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
217 See Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 322-24 (1971) (re-
counting rejection of mutuality rule for defensive collateral estoppel by the California
Supreme Court, numerous federal and state courts, and commentators).
2 8 See supra note 32.
219 See Nelson, supra note 23.
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treated as an exercise of inherent authority. As Edmund Randolph
put it in Chisholm, "[I]f it be not otherwise prescribed by law, or
long usage, [the procedure in question] is in the discretion of the
Court.
221
I would be remiss if I failed to point out that while federal pro-
cedural common law has its place, congressional intervention has
reduced its importance. The statutory authority of each federal
court to adopt local, prospective court rules has always reduced the
need to rely on inherent procedural authority to regulate local pro-
cedure.221 And since it was passed in 1934, the Rules Enabling Act,
not the common law method, has been the primary vehicle for the
development of uniform procedure in the federal courts. That Act
provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to pre-
scribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evi-
dence for cases in the United States district courts.., and courts of
appeals. '2  Consider that the federal rules of civil procedure,
criminal procedure, and evidence adopted pursuant to the Act
largely replaced the old doctrines of general procedural common
law by translating them into uniform court rules-sometimes
wholesale and sometimes with significant modifications.223 In an
important respect, therefore, the doctrines that have lingered on in
common law form are anomalies insofar as they attempt uniform
regulation of federal procedure outside of the statutorily provided
framework. That is probably a good thing. Even though tradition
and consensus mediate the development of these doctrines, there is
..
0 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 428 (1793); see supra note 175 and ac-
companying tcxt.
221 Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized every federal court to adopt
local court rules. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. Today, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071(a) confers the same power. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
222 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000). It is worth noting that federal rules adopted pursuant
to the Act narrow the range of procedural matters left open to the exercise of inher-
ent authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000) ("All laws in conflict with such rules
shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.").
23The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure continued, with minor changes, many pro-
cedural mechanisms long employed by the common law system. For example, motions
to dismiss (previously known as demurrers), motions for new trials, and even class ac-
tions are procedural devices long employed by courts of common law and equity. At
the same time, it made significant changes to the common law by, for example, replac-
ing common law with notice pleading. The Federal Rules of Evidence are similarly
modeled upon many longstanding common law doctrines. For example, both the
hearsay and character rules largely codify the common law.
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reason to think that those involved in the rulemaking process,
which solicits the views of the legal community at large, are better
equipped than federal judges to gauge whether consensus exists
with respect to any particular procedural innovation. 4
CONCLUSION
Federal procedural common law is supported by the twin justifi-
cations that federal courts can develop uniform common law rules
in enclaves of constitutional preemption and that Article III impli-
edly grants each federal court power to regulate its procedure in
the course of adjudicating cases. These two strands of authority,
sometimes distinct and sometimes overlapping, have yielded a
body of judicially developed procedure that is a combination of
uniform procedural doctrines representing general consensus and
isolated procedural rules representing the discretionary choice of
the adopting court.
Recognizing that procedural common law derives from two
sources clarifies the posture of federal courts vis-A-vis Congress in
the regulation of procedure. Congress is free to abrogate or change
uniform procedural doctrines, just as it has always been free to
modify the content of federal common law. Congress is also free to
regulate most matters that federal courts would otherwise regulate
themselves in reliance upon their inherent authority. To the extent
that there are any matters insulated from congressional control,
they are matters of the latter sort. Claims of exclusive judicial au-
thority are rooted in inherent authority; hence, they are claims of
local authority. Uniform procedural regulation is ultimately in the
control of Congress.
224 Cf. Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking? 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 901,
923-25 (2002) (arguing that federal rulemaking process, rather than procedural com-
mon law, is the best vehicle for introducing innovative changes, because the rulemak-
ing process solicits input from the larger legal community).
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